



Finansijska, organizaciona i administrativna procjena policijskih snaga BiH i Državne granične službe  
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Financijska, organizaciona i administrativna procjena policijskih snaga BiH i Državne granične službe  
Financial, Organisational and Administrative Assessment of the BiH Police Forces and the State Border Service

# **FINANCIAL, ORGANISATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE BIH POLICE FORCES AND THE STATE BORDER SERVICE FINAL ASSESSMENT REPORT**

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## List of Abbreviations

BGS	Bundes Grenz Schutz
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BCP	Border Crossing Point
BVPI	Best Value Performance Indicators
CIS	Centralised Information System
CIPS	Citizen Identification Protection System for BiH
CPD	Continuing Professional Education
DAC	Development Co-operation Directorate
DFID	Department for International Development
DPA	Dayton Peace Accords
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FY	Financial Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
IC	International Community
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Forum on Accountancy Development
IPTF	International Police Task Force
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member States
MuP	Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova (Mol)

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OHR	Office of the High Representative
PAR	Public Administration Reform
P&SM	Purchase and Supply Management
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
PSC	Police Security Centre
RS	Republika Srpska
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
Sap	Stabilisation and Association process
SBS	State Border Service
SIPA	State Information and Protection Agency
SPI	Strategic Performance Indicators
SPRS	Standardised Police Reporting System
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
USAID	United States' Agency for International Development
VFM	Value for Money

## **MANAGEMENT SUMMARY**

### **Assessment of the Present Situation**

#### **Police Services**

Today, the different police forces of BiH deliver basic public security services of acceptable quality, taking the difficult context into account. This result is achieved by the action of several good local professionals and by the important support from the international Community.

75% of the population express that they feel secure, which is a good result in local security (victimisation survey in 2001). This compares to 77% for Belgium and Switzerland in 2000, 71.8% for Slovenia in 1996 and 64% for Poland in 2000.

Response time to emergency calls is not measured systematically but seems to be acceptable (5-10 minutes in urban areas, 15-50 minutes in rural areas) and comparable to European standards.

The road accident ratio (2003: 14.7 fatal accidents per 100,000 inhabitants, 209 accidents with injured) is on the negative side of the European spectrum, especially if we take into account the comparatively small number of cars per 1,000 inhabitants (Germany 8.3 accidents with fatalities, Netherlands 6.1; but France 12.1; Slovenia 12.2).

The level of classic crime (excluding organised crime, corruption, terrorism) is lower than in the EU and candidate States (e.g. percentage of inhabitants who were victims of burglary in the past year, BiH 1.3; Belgium 2; Slovenia 2.3). The percentage of solved crimes of around 60% is quite high. A rate of 50% is considered to be a success in Western European police.

But the police forces of BiH are not prepared for a (European) future. They are working with an outdated policing philosophy, without clear modernisation strategies, with an old management style, with mostly outdated equipment and systems and with too many under-trained police officers.

New significant problems like organised crime, terrorism, drugs, money laundering, but also juvenile delinquency, domestic violence and care for victims are not properly addressed by the current system.

#### **Border Guarding**

The situation of the State Border Service is somewhat different from the other LEAs. It is a young organisation, built from scratch with strong international support, both with regard to investment as well as direct advice on modern border management. The organisation is focused on reaching European standards, and uses the relevant instruments such as the Schengen Catalogue as its guiding tools. Major steps, however, still need to be taken to create a border service fully able to implement its tasks according to these standards. Serious financial constraints have

led to a 20% understaffing of the SBS (2350 planned, compared to 1961 currently employed), even after the rationalisation of its staff structure. This puts a lot of pressure on the organisation to improvise in order to fulfil its operational tasks, and makes it difficult to take further steps in the 'European' direction. The planned size of the organisation is on the small side when compared to other European border services. The salaries are comparable to those in new EU Member States such as Hungary and Slovakia. The limited budgetary means results in problems with regard to using and maintaining vehicles and equipment, which have led to a situation in which especially the green border is not sufficiently monitored. With regard to investment in infrastructure the SBS is fully dependent on the international community.

A further serious problem is the lack of training for the line, middle and senior management, many of whom did not even receive the transitional training after changing their positions from the various police forces to the SBS. With the exception of few internationally funded projects, management training programmes are still not implemented.

The problematic and contradictory legal situation of the SBS is in a process of much needed improvement. The present legal problems range from areas of responsibility and reporting lines to unsuitable salary structures. This hinders a more efficient fulfilment of the tasks of the organisation. Comparing to several other border guarding services in the region, as well as to LEAs in BiH, the SBS is advanced, but the vision of a service living up to European standards and best practices is yet remote.

### **Management**

A critical issue is the outdated management style at all levels. Political supervision by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is not clearly separated from operational management by the Commissioner. This leads to unclear responsibilities and, again, to overstaffing in the administrative functions. There are no clearly defined and deployed policing strategies, no precise objectives with measured result control. The annual action programmes are most often simply general listings of all police duties. With a few exceptions – first steps of Community policing – there is no focused client / citizen orientation, no real human resources management.

As at 31 December 2003, there were at total 22,650 personnel employed in the MoIs and SBS, of which 16,711 authorised police officers and 5,939 civil employees. Out of the total number of the civilian support staff 4,355 personnel were under the direct command of the Minister of Interior. Findings have revealed that 97% of their work relates to police activities; however, their existing management system makes them directly accountable to the Minister of Interior and not the relevant Police Commissioner/Director. This situation does not provide an efficient, effective or economic service.

Financial management is improving, due to the recently introduced Treasury system. However, budgeting and controlling still have to be recognised as one of the key responsibilities of a Police Commissioner and need the presence of qualified specialists in his staff.



### **Books of Rules**

In some instances, the existing Books of Rules/Directives are a source of misinformation, not reflecting the real situation, conflicting in several cases with State legislation and leading to overlapping of non-operational police tasks. At best, they serve to disguise the inefficient use of resources both in human and financial terms.

### **Technology**

Modern technology only starts to emerge. Specific crime laboratories, information technology, surveillance equipment, communication systems are planned with the help of the international Community, but there still is a long way to go.

### **Overstaffing**

The weaknesses in technology and modern concepts are partly compensated by overstaffing. A first estimation based on the analysis of the different units and the specific products shows an overstaffing of about 3,000 police officers.

### **Overall Organisation**

The fact that there are 15 LEAs (Federation, RS, 10 Cantons, Brčko District, SBS and SIPA) is not a weakness *per se*. Several European countries have organised their public security sector in the same way. They build on regional autonomous units, supervised by regional political authorities, which are well integrated in their regional environment and closely linked to the other administrations. The Dutch police system consists of 25 autonomous police regions and one central unit; Switzerland is organised in 26 Cantonal police forces and one federal police. This type of organisation comes close to a network of small and medium size enterprises compared with a large industrial group.

What is negative in the present BiH police organisation is the fact that there are three layers, Canton/PSC, Entity, and State where, from a police point of view, two layers are enough. Another negative point is that there are no mechanisms for structural cooperation among the smaller units concerning rapid intervention (costly operational centres), specialised crime combating (expensive specialists and equipment) and crowd control. A permanent cooperation would allow substantial cost savings. The existing numerous, highly decentralised operational centres (control rooms) could, in the long run, be concentrated in 5-7 modern operational centres.

Also missing are nationwide ties, holding the whole system together and guaranteeing coherence, efficiency, inter-operability and economy of scale. Specific support functions, such as selection and training, a nationwide information- and communication system, and a centralised procurement unit should be common functions. Bulk purchasing of standard police equipment, uniforms, etc., would allow direct savings by



obtaining lower unit costs and also provide the opportunity to obtain higher quality standards. In addition there is also a need for specific coordination functions in the case of supra-regional crime and for problems at events of nationwide importance.

### **Salaries**

The percentage of personnel costs (wages and salaries) is comparable to the benchmarking countries. However, the investments possible from the local budget are insufficient to finance the necessary reconstruction and modernisation of the force. Also, in many cases the salary of the individual police officer is too low to attract and to retain qualified staff. There is no nationwide salary scheme linking a basic salary to a countrywide category/grade structure within the police/SBS, there are wide disparities in salaries across agencies, and the existing pay structure is both complicated and inequitable, both for existing officers and those seeking a professional career as a police officer. Present net basic salaries vary from 340 KM per month in RS to 1259 KM per month in Brčko District. This creates dissatisfaction and stress due to secondary jobs but also creates a situation conducive for corruption.

### **Sustainability**

Today, the share of public security spending of the overall public expenditure is very high by international standards. With a 9.2% it is about 3 times higher than in Slovenia and more than twice that of Hungary. Given the high and prohibitive public expenditure in BiH, a reduction of the public security expenditure is necessary and will be a contribution to the general financial health of the State. A second problem identified is the heavy burden put on the Cantons by police budget. On average 20% of the public expenditure in the Cantons are spent on policing while Cantons have to sustain other expensive public policies (in the health, social and education sectors). The problem is exacerbated in small and rural Cantons. As a complementary measure to staff reduction, the future system should review the current allocation of policies and resources between the levels of government and adjust it according to the distribution of responsibilities for service provision.

Financial and social sustainability should be reached in the long term by reducing the cost of overstaffing in police personnel (3,000 x 18,000 KM = 54 million KM) and a number of support personnel and converting parts of the savings into a social plan and a more appropriate and harmonised salary scheme on the one hand, and into necessary capital investment to modernise the equipments on the other.

The overall sustainability of the ongoing public security reform will remain weak as long as there is no strong local ownership of the reform process. This presents an important risk factor for the return of the international Community investment in the modernisation of the police forces in BiH.

### **Police Reform in the PAR context**

This functional assessment is the first of a series of functional reviews, covering the main sectors of the BiH administration within a broader Public Administration Reform process. It is evident that these administration sectors are interrelated and cannot be seen in an isolated way.

All reform proposals have to fit – or have to be adapted to fit – into a coherent overall reform framework. Important consequences may also arise from a potential constitutional reform.

Independent of the proposals made for the adaptation of the overall organisation, the following points would apply throughout:

- new ways of policing,
- better quality of police products,
- modernisation of the support processes,
- acquisition of advanced equipment.

### **The Vision**

The different products of the BiH police forces should be re-defined and brought in line with the best European practice.

Regional units should organise local security at the level of the municipalities or associations of municipalities by:

- Creating local security councils
- Stimulating local security programmes assessable with indicators and controlling results (indicators are e.g. victimisation rates, sense of security, satisfaction with the police)
- Re-allocating the resources (1 officer for 1,000 inhabitants in urban areas; 1 officer for 2,000 inhabitants in rural areas)
- Reorganising the number and type of patrols in the streets
- Introducing new processes and methods such as local security diagnostics, partnership projects, problem-solving, soft specialisation in investigating petty crimes.

Coordination mechanisms between local security and the other police products must guarantee a good balance in resource allocation among the different products, and facilitate collaboration with other institutional partners.

Rapid intervention as well as the management of large events need to be organised at a regional level also for technical and financial reasons. These products need:

- The transformation of the traffic police into a new rapid intervention unit (the target ratio is 1 officer per 1,000 inhabitants).
- An investment in new (regional) operation rooms (5-7 rooms for BiH) with modern equipment and well trained, specialised operators.
- Clear targets and monitoring of response time (< 5 minutes in urban areas, < 20 minutes in rural areas).
- The reorganisation of the numerous local support units into regional divisions.

Crime investigation needs to be thoroughly reorganised. Street/petty crimes should be investigated by the uniformed police at the local level. Serious crimes need to be combated at a regional level while organised crime, money-laundering, financial crimes or other complex crimes need to be addressed at the central level of government. Vertical cooperation (between levels of government) and horizontal cooperation (across units of governments) needs to be stimulated.

Management of the whole police has to be reconsidered. Political supervision has to be separated from operational management.

Changes in legislation need to ensure that the majority of the administration/support staff (97%) with the exception of the CIPS staff come under the direct command of the Police Commissioner/Director. Existing Ministers of Interior should have no direct day-to-day control over the administration/support staff and indeed the Ministers should only have a minimum number of competent senior cabinet advisors working directly for him/her. A full review of the applicable laws and by-laws should ensure that Books of Rules are in line with reality and requirements in order to avoid, *inter alia*, overlapping of non-operational police tasks.

Mobilising 'common causes', strategies with a clear profile and measurable objectives have to be introduced. Budget responsibility is part of the Commissioner's job.

Nationwide information- and communication systems have to be introduced and centrally managed.

A central procurement unit with common procurement procedures for standardised equipment guarantees inter-operability and best prices.

The SBS should continue on its way to attain the standards of the EU Acquis and the Schengen best practices and develop a concrete integrated border management strategy. The Bosnian authorities should strive to implement the so-called four-tiers system, whereby obviously the SBS has the major role to fulfil.

The future overall organisation is strategy-, process- and product-oriented; it ensures a good balance of centralised and decentralised units, and it is tailor-made to the needs and realities of BiH.

Three basic organisational options were analysed:

- A national police as a zero base, top down approach. This model is based on rationality, favours internal efficiency, aims at short and clear command structures and is built on uniformity throughout the whole country.
- Two Entity police forces, Brčko District, SIPA and SBS. This model is also a top down model, but builds on important elements of today's reality, namely the Entities and Brčko District. For the rest, it strives to ensure rationality and efficiency. The difficulty is to justify the existence of the two top layers in the organisation – State and Entities – where in a normal, efficient situation, one layer – the State level – would suffice.
- A bottom up model, starting from the future police products and the local realities. This organisation is based upon the Cantons, the RS (with PSCs), Brčko District, the SIPA and the SBS. In addition, it would need strong regional cooperation among the smaller Cantons and new common national functions for coordination, selection and training, information and communication systems as well as for central procurement.

All three models feature both advantages and disadvantages. The evaluation and final choice depend on the weight given to the different criteria like top down or bottom up, product orientation, integration in local/regional communities, rationality, distance to today's realities, etc. The financial sustainability has to be guaranteed by a better use of the local public security budgets (e.g. 70% for personnel costs, 15% for running costs, 15% for new investments). To reach a sustainable level, BiH should set a first target of 5% for the policing share of the total public spending. This will be achieved via reorganisation and restructuring which will increase productivity and adaptation and, as a consequence, will allow a significant reduction in personnel cost.

The social sustainability is based on a staffing following European best practice with one police officer for about 300 inhabitants, on fair salaries being part of a common salary system, and on the implementation of a fair social plan, having allowed the reduction of overstaffing step by step, whilst ameliorating the age structure.

The institutional sustainability of the BiH police will be assured by maintaining the culture and spirit of a learning organisation, accepting that police reform is a never-ending process.

## **The Road**

The most important element for a successful implementation programme is to create a strong local ownership of the reform process.

In a first phase, political consensus should be reached on the analysis of the present situation, the vision and the road to the future. This will be the task of the planned Police Commission. This Commission should get support from external experts in order to maintain the discussions at an objective level and to have a maximum of additional information on European best practice at hand.

Once a consensus is reached, a professionally led project organisation 'Future BiH Police' should be set up, with strong local participation as well as a local project leader. This project organisation has to work out detailed implementation programmes for all elements of 'Future BiH Police', taking as a starting point the political consensus attained. A possible timeframe for this work would be 8-10 months.

The project group should be supervised by a political Steering Committee (the Police Commission?) and assisted by police reform experts.

In parallel to the launch of the project group, a large information and deployment programme on 'Future BiH Police' should be initiated. Specific information and training modules have to be prepared for MoIs and relevant members of parliaments.

Some specific actions with high priority could also be started in parallel to the project, e.g.

- Basic training for managers on new policing
- Training in financial management
- Training in local security
- Development of a common salary system
- Development of the social plan for the reduction of overstaffing.

Ongoing police reform and modernisation projects should be integrated in, or at least connected to 'Future BiH Police'.

If possible, a series of visits to selected European police organisations, being near to best practices, should be organised. This is often an optimal persuasion and explanation method.



## BACKGROUND

### THE POST-WAR SITUATION WITH REGARD TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) bringing the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to a hold endowed the country with largely decentralised authorities. This situation was specifically true for the police forces. The two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS) maintained their own police forces under the control of their respective Interior Ministers. On the FBiH side, police is further decentralised, with each of the ten Cantons also possessing a Ministry of Interior (*Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, MUP*). In contrast, the RS avails of a more centralised police force, as it is merely subdivided geographically into regional Public Security Centres (PSCs) and local police stations.

The Federation Ministry of Interior in effect received rather limited powers, such as coordinating inter-entity and inter-cantonal co-operation, leaving the ten Cantonal Interior Ministries responsible for all other aspects of law enforcement. By contrast, the RS Ministry of Interior was made responsible for all crime prevention and enforcement within the Entity.

In addition, the Brčko District sustains its own autonomous police force, imbedded in its own structures, as prescribed by the DPA, the subsequent arbitration, and the resulting statute.

In accordance with the BiH Constitution as foreseen by Annex 4 of the DPA, the State level was made responsible merely for ‘*international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol*’. In order to provide the State with the institutions necessary to fulfil these tasks, the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) was created in 2002. SIPA is tasked with exchanging law enforcement information and in addition, with providing protection for national institutions and representatives. It shall facilitate inter-entity and regional cooperation in combating organised crime, human trafficking and international terrorism.

The political responsibility for law enforcement thus was fractured. On the State level, the Ministry of Civil Affairs was from 1996 until the creation of the Ministry of Security responsible, among other issues, for allocation of funds to and legislation of the SBS, for Interpol issues, for passports and other law enforcement measures. The creation of the Ministry of Security in 2003 aimed at further centralising and consolidating the situation.

The described structural and organisational division was aggravated by prevailing legal discrepancies, such as inconsistencies between Cantonal laws on internal affairs and Federation criminal procedures, as well as between laws relating to identical crimes to name but a few. In effect, therefore, the Dayton Peace Accords created and reinforced a substantial fragmentation of public authority and responsibilities. In combination with the 1994 Washington Agreement providing the framework for the Federation, this led to equally fragmented police forces and policing structures.



Today, vertical and horizontal communication among and between the various sections and levels of governments, necessary co-ordination and co-operation is oftentimes cumbersome or altogether inexistent.

The DPA stipulates that *‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall assume responsibility for such other matters as are [...] necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. [...] Additional institutions may be established as necessary to carry out such responsibilities’*.<sup>1</sup> After protracted negotiations in the BiH parliament, the State Border Service (SBS) was created in 2000 after the OHR enacted the Law on State Border Service. The Service is responsible both for controlling BiH’s some 1600 kilometre-long international frontiers and for pursuing all border-related crimes throughout BiH.

### **The International Police Task Force (IPTF) – The Dayton Peace Accords - Annex 11**

Annex 11 of the DPA decreed that the *‘maintenance of safe and secure environment for all persons’* is the responsibility of the *‘parties’*. Yet, as part of the GFAP, the International Police Task Force was charged with ensuring that Bosnia’s post-war police operate *‘in accordance with internationally recognised standards and with respect for internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms’*.<sup>2</sup> The signatories to the GFAP *‘requested’* the UN Security Council to create the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in order to support them discharge the duty to maintain a *safe and secure environment*. The IPTF was to carry out as its main tasks the following functions:

- to monitor, observe and inspect judicial and law enforcement activities, including joint patrols with local police;
- to advise and train law enforcement personnel;
- to assess threats to public order and to advise government authorities on the effective organisation of their police forces; and
- to facilitate improvements in law enforcement within IPTF’s remit.

IPTF was involved in changing the primary focus of the local police from the *security of the state to the security of the individual*. The police forces were largely downsized. IPTF helped to recreate multi-ethnic police forces to make sure that they were professional and effective.

This restructuring and reform function expanded beyond the Ministry of Interior with IPTF being involved in the establishment and training of Court Police, the State Border Service and the Bosnia and Herzegovina police contingent selected for duty in UN peacekeeping missions abroad.

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<sup>1</sup> Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 4, Article III, 5 (a).

<sup>2</sup> Annex 4, Article III, 2 (c).

At the end of 2002, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) expired. The UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) mandate expired at the same time.<sup>3</sup>

### **EU Police Mission (EUPM)**

Taking over from where the UNMIBH's IPTF stopped, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was established on 11 March 2002<sup>4</sup> for duration of three years and started on 1 January 2003. The mission is part of a broad approach followed by the EU and other actors, with activities addressing the whole range of Rule of Law aspects.

In line with the general objectives of the Dayton Agreement, in particular through monitoring, mentoring and inspection of managerial and operational capabilities activities EUPM seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice.

### **EU PERSPECTIVE**

In Feira, in June 2000, the European Council opened the perspective of future membership to the EU for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This membership perspective was subsequently reconfirmed several times, most recently by the European Council in Thessalonica in June 2003. On its path towards being included in EU structures, and to ultimately be granted membership in the future however, BiH will need to fulfil several specific preconditions. As for all countries that aspire to join the Union, BiH has to fulfil the entry requirements as established by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 and as stipulated in Articles 6 and 49 of the EU Treaty.

In addition, BiH must, furthermore, meet the criteria specific to the Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) as laid down in the Conclusions of the General Affairs Council in April 1997 and in line with the Commission Communication of May 1999 on the establishment of the SAP. In the progress of the SAP, BiH is gradually transgressing from a post-war situation with its intricate priorities of crisis management, reconstruction and rehabilitation to progressively face issues closer to those encountered by other candidate countries as they previously prepared for EU membership, such as institutional, judicial, economic and legislative reform.

Yet, as identified in broad terms in the European Commission's *Third Sap Annual Report 'disagreements concerning the distribution of power among peoples, parties, national and sub-national levels of government and by complex or ambiguous constitutional arrangements'*

<sup>3</sup> The IPTF was the only body charged by the DPA to work on reforming the police. Yet, numerous other organisations and groups contributed to the efforts, such as ICITAP, IMPACT, UNHCR, OHR, OHCHR, OSCE, SECI, SFOR, ICMPD and many bilateral donors.

<sup>4</sup> Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP. Security Council Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002.

still hold back several countries in the Western Balkan region. This description certainly captures the political, administrative and social circumstances still prevailing largely in BiH.

For the purpose of the *Financial, Organisational and Administrative Assessment of the BiH Police Forces and the State Border Service* most importantly, these criteria include the building up of State law enforcement capacities, and proceeding with structural police reform with a view to rationalising police services. In brief, on its way to a more advanced relationship with the European Union, BiH needs to implement far-reaching reforms and develop adequate institutional capacities in order to be in the position to honour in practice its obligations arising from a future Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).

### Feasibility Study

After having *substantially completed* in 2002 the 18 short-term steps identified in the 2000 Road Map, the European Commission (EC) issued the report on *'the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union'* in November 2003 with a view to identifying more specifically persisting shortcomings, as well as assessing BiH's readiness under the SAP. This so-called *'feasibility study'* identified 16 priority reform areas to be addressed in the course of 2004.

With regard to public administration, the Commission's report estimates that *'if BiH is to make progress towards a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), it must develop a stable public administration based on a clear legal framework and characterised by efficiency, professionalism and independence*. This fact has been recognised by the BiH governments at various levels already in March 2003. However, the Commission continues to underline that *'[T]he administration is slow, unpredictable and absorbs too much public money. It is multi-layered, with (sometimes competing) bureaucracies at State, Entity, cantonal and municipal levels. Its system of remuneration needs to be clarified and standardised. Staff are poorly trained and ill-equipped to meet the new challenges a SAA would imply. In administration, as in government, strategic planning and co-ordination capacities are limited'*. In recent times a growing appreciation of the need to develop these administrative capacities can be noticed within BiH. Yet, further reform of the public administration is urgently needed to deliver timely and quality services to the BiH citizens.

In March 2003, therefore, aiming at improving the public administration, the BiH governments endorsed five public administration reform pledges (*'Reform Agendas'*) at the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The resulting agenda underlined the need for structural reform leading to an efficient, non-discriminatory and affordable administration. Moreover, the agenda acknowledged the need to pull together existing achievements with functional reviews in order to produce a comprehensive and cost-estimated Action Plan for public administration reform by autumn 2004.

In the March 2003 agenda for ‘*Reforming the Public Administration*’, BiH governments recognised that the public administration did not yet meet the expectations of all citizens: it is slow, unpredictable and absorbed too much public money. It is multi-layered, with (sometimes competing) bureaucracies at State, Entity, Cantonal and municipal levels.

The EC acknowledged that police reform progressed significantly under the UN-led IPTF and is currently being consolidated with BiH co-operation through the work of the EU Police Mission.

In the view of the EC ‘*[C]rime, both opportunist and organised, became widespread, and corruption put deep roots into the social, economic and political fabric of society*’. The full implementation of the reforms currently underway will determine whether BiH can establish rule of law and due process. The guarantee of a reliable and predictable legal space is a pre-condition for the operation of an effective SAA.

As stated in the Feasibility Study ‘*[U]nder a Stabilisation and Association Agreement the contracting parties would attach particular importance to [...] the reinforcement of institutions at all levels in the areas of administration in general and law enforcement and the machinery of justice in particular*’.

Today, ultimately based on the Dayton structures and its subsequent dynamics, Police forces in BiH are organised on a number of levels: there are 10 FBiH Cantonal police forces, one Brčko District, one FBiH and one RS police force, the SBS, SIPA, judicial police and financial police. Thus, in a country of less than four million inhabitants, law enforcement personnel of 14 LEAs (including support) consist of around 22,650 staff, with an approved budget in FY 2003 of 353,789,399 KM. It seems obvious that the complexity of the existing multiple police forces increases costs and complicates co-ordination and effectiveness.

In cooperation with EUPM, BiH policing has improved: professionalism has increased, management capacity has grown and co-operation between police services and other enforcement agencies (e.g. SBS and customs authorities) has developed. The creation in 2003 of the new State level Ministry of Security has also contributed to consolidate the situation and strengthen State level coordination and further facilitate inter-entity co-operation in police affairs. The Ministry has coordination competence for State level concerns such as border control and combating terrorism (i.e. SBS, SIPA and Interpol). BiH must now consider **further restructuring and rationalising** police services in order to enhance efficiency and improve crime combating capabilities.

The elaboration of a comprehensive knowledge base for such restructuring and rationalising is the purpose of the present assessment. The results of this six-month exercise evaluating the financial, organisational and administrative conditions of the BiH police forces and the State Border Service is provided in the main part of the Assessment Report further below and shall allow the commencement of a well-informed reform of these law enforcement agencies.



## EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP

Aiming at assisting future EU Member States (MS) in the preparation for full membership, the European Partnerships, based on the annual SAP reports, are to identify short- and medium term priorities which the individual countries need to address and shall thus serve as checklists against which progress towards EU standards is to be measured. Along the way, these priorities are gradually to be geared towards the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* and the accomplishment of these priorities is to equip the countries concerned with the institutional and legislative framework and administrative capacity required to govern a modern democratic society with functioning market economies.

The priorities identified in the proposed European Partnership for BiH relating to a **more effective public administration** call upon the BiH authorities to make further effort towards creating an effective public administration, including developing a comprehensive and cost-estimated Action Plan for public administration reform with a clear distribution of competences (exemplifying specifically the areas of police and health).

With regard to co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs, the Partnership prioritises the building up of a State level law enforcement capacity by allocating the necessary resources and facilities to ensure the full functioning of the SIPA and the BiH Ministry of Security, and proceeding with structural police reform with a view to rationalising police services.

In the medium term, the BiH authorities are expected to advance police reform, thus to implement recommendations of **functional and strategic reviews** of the police sector and ensure co-operation among law enforcement agencies.

As regards Border Management, the authorities are called upon to endorse and implement an Integrated Border Management Strategy, and to facilitate regional co-operation and trade by improving border management and transport facilities. Further to develop co-operation between the State Border Service, the customs service, the police and the Prosecutor's Office to interdict and prosecute trafficking and other cross-border crime, as well as to improve the administrative capacity of the visa issuing regime, particularly the checking of visa applications.

In conclusion, in the face of decreasing international financial contributions and support from the international community substantial and meaningful reform of the public administration in general and in particular in the JHA sector, including Police and SBS are essential preconditions for initiating negotiations on and for the practical implementation of the SAA eventually concluded between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## 2004 SAP REPORT

Further documentation of the situation and direction of the public administration reform process and law enforcement agencies are identified by the EC in the 2004 Stabilisation and Association process report. This report, reviewing BiH's current situation, aimed at providing an initial progress report on the 16 priority reform areas outlined in the abovementioned *Feasibility Study*. In the 2004 SAP report the EC attested

that despite continuing improvements under EUPM guidance in the police sector, **structural reform of BiH's multiple police forces** has barely begun and that the improvements of the capacities of the Ministry of Security continue to grow at a slow pace.

With regard to the **State Border Service** the EC noticed - disregarding operational constraints caused by financial and technical weaknesses – that it, with EUPM support, co-operates with police services, customs authorities and the prosecution services, and that *'the introduction of intelligence- and investigation-led policing has already produced improved results in addressing human trafficking and other cross-border crimes.'*

## **ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE FORCES AND SBS WITHIN THE BROADER PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM PROCESS**

It is widely acknowledged today that the historically important but in practise highly complex legal and political construction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the consequential distribution of competencies between the State level institutions, the respective entities, the FBiH Cantons and the municipalities pose severe challenges to the ongoing development from a post-conflict situation towards a modern democratic society based on a functioning market economy. In this context, the abovementioned *Feasibility Study* warns that *'[T]he complexity of the Dayton structure could hinder BiH performance'*.

The various layers of administration contribute to the situation in which a clear attribution of responsibilities, sense of ownership, vertical and horizontal communication among, and co-ordination and cooperation between the political actors are often cumbersome. As a consequence of this intricate institutional structure, BiH is burdened by a bloated public sector, which is both vertically and horizontally fragmented and responsible for consuming close to half the country's GDP. The present size and scope of public spending is well beyond the levels that can be sustained in the medium term.<sup>5</sup> The potentially fragile fiscal situation at all levels of government, which stems from an insufficient tax base, inefficient revenue collection and a deplorable loss of resources, and BiH medium term adjustment needs in the current account balance, call for serious change to improve expenditure rationalisation.

Moreover, there are additional pressures on public spending both at present and in the period ahead. Increasingly pressure is brought to bear on the State level, as the institutions of BiH have to evolve in order to endow the State with the capacity to perform its functions adequately and to lead the process of economic reform and other growing international commitments, like the participation in the EU Stabilisation and Association process as outlined at some length above.

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<sup>5</sup> The World Bank has pointed out that the present level of public expenditures in BiH amounts to approximately 47 per cent of its GDP. This is much higher than the 35 per cent spent in other comparable countries in the region. Even countries with a stronger economic base could not afford the public expenditure level of BiH. According to other sources, the public expenditures are even higher.



The increase in the number of government institutions at State level, extensive administrative structures arising from multiple layers of government and the scarcity of public funds call for expenditure rationalisation within the public sector, as well as for an overall improvement of the institutional, administrative and technical capacity of the public sector in BiH.

As already stated, at the abovementioned March 2003 meeting of the PIC, BiH undertook to develop a comprehensive, country-wide **public administration reform** (PAR) strategy by autumn 2004. In this context a National Co-ordinator, an Inter-Governmental Task Force (IGTF) and a number of working groups have been formed. In November 2003, the three prime ministers signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Commission setting up a Functional Review Steering Committee to guide the systemic and functional reviews which will feed into the PAR Action Plan for autumn 2004. In the view of the Commission, *‘[M]eeting PAR reform targets will certainly throw up difficult questions about the organisation of the public service throughout BiH. To achieve effective administrative reform, effective BiH leadership and clear strategic guidance are required’*.

As part of this process, extensive functional reviews are currently under way at all levels of Government. The present Financial, Organisational and Administrative Assessments of the BiH Police Forces and the State Border Service is one among several *Vertical Reviews* currently being implemented under the national CARDS 2003 programme which aims at providing a state-of-the-art knowledge base which is to inform the comprehensive public administration reform process set to take off in autumn 2004.

As soon as it ascertains that significant progress has been made in meeting the 16 requirements established in the Feasibility Study, the European Commission will decide on a recommendation for a Council decision to open SAA negotiations. Conversely, if progress is insufficient, the Commission will not be in a position to recommend proceeding with such negotiations.

Furthermore, Community assistance under the Stabilisation and Association process to the individual Western Balkan countries is **conditional** on further progress in satisfying the Copenhagen political criteria and in particular progress in meeting the specific priorities of the European Partnership. Failure to respect these general conditions could lead the Council to take ‘appropriate’ measures on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000, i.e. deciding, with a qualified majority, on adequate responses to reduce or withdraw assistance and support altogether, thus in effect delaying the approximation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards closer EU relations.

Concluding, the steps seen essential by the EC to ensure that BiH will be in the position to move closer to EU standards have been identified and mapped out specifically in the abovementioned political instruments, starting with the Road Map of 2000, continuing with the annual SAP

Overview of Reviews in BiH						
Vertical Review of Environmental Sector	Vertical Review of Agriculture Sector	Vertical Review of Economy Sector	Vertical Review of Return Sector	Vertical Review of Health Sector	Vertical Review of Police and SBS	Vertical Review of Justice Sector
PAR Co-ordinator within Ministry of Justice						
SYSTEM REVIEW						
(human resources management, public finances, legislative drafting, administrative procedures, IT networking)						

reports, leading to the Feasibility Study of late 2003 and the proposed European Partnership agreement in 2004, the EC urges to ‘create expeditiously the foundation for contractual relations through a SAA’.

It is in this context that the present *Financial, Organisational and Administrative Assessments of the BiH Police Forces and the State Border Service* has been carried out and is presenting the results of its various exercises geared towards systematically mapping out the sectoral situation of the law enforcement agencies. Thus, the results obtained are being provided in the following substantial chapters and are intended to give a solid basis for the imminent and comprehensive reform process directed at bringing Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to the EU in a joint effort.

As this assessment of the BiH Police Forces and the State Border Service was carried out in the broader framework of the Stabilisation and Association process, it is acknowledged that the overriding goal is the systematic and gradual adaptation to EU standards and the *acquis* in Justice and Home Affairs issues. However, the question to what extent the present police and SBS systems are congruent with EU standards has not been explicitly part of the present assessment. It is anticipated that this issue of legislation and standards will be given more attention as the SAP progresses in the future.

## AGENDA

### Police Assessment – a System Approach

Analysis of the Present Situation

Products  
Support Processes / Organisation  
Personnel  
Finance  
SBS

SWOT Summary

Analyses of the Environment

The Vision: Future Strategies and Structural Consequences

Products  
Support processes / Organisation  
Personnel  
Finance

The Road to the Future

Management of Change Strategies  
The Implementation Program

## 1 MAIN STEPS OF THE PROJECT


### 1.1 Police a Learning Organisation

The main steps of the project are:

1. Analysis of the present situation
2. Vision 'Future BiH Police'
3. The road


To become a successful and sustainable reform and development process, it is essential to:

- Initiate large communication and consensus building for each step
- Maintain a rolling process with reassessment at regular intervals



### 1.1.1 The Work Plan of the Assessment Mission

#### The work plan of the assessment mission




The classical approach to the assessment (analysis of the existing state of affairs, the SWOT and the recommendation in the final report) integrated ownership elements through:

- the involvement of the agencies analysed and the controlling agencies in the data collection
- a workshop on the SWOT involving the police commissioners/directors of all agencies under review, as well as the financial and organisational liaison officers, with the objective to discuss the results and to identify critical issues for a future development
- the involvement of the Ministers in charge of public security for information and debates on the methodology and the results of the assessment (Steering Committee).

## 1.2 The Police Scorecard

- Analysis, Vision and Roadmap follow the same method:  
The Police Scorecard



### What is the Police Scorecard?

The Scorecard is a management of change instrument initially developed for the industry that considers an organisation holistically as composed by four main strategic elements:

- products
- processes and organisation
- finance and
- personnel

Reorganisation needs to assure coherence as well as balance between all four elements. In other words, to privilege one element at the expense of the others may create disequilibrium detrimental to the whole organisation. The main strategic goal of any reorganisation must be to achieve equilibrium and balance in its restructuring measures. Methodologically, the Scorecard implicates that all strategic elements are monitored with measurable indicators to scientifically manage and steer change



### 1.3 Design of the research during the data collection phase

#### The units of analysis

The 10 Cantonal police forces, the Federation police, the RS police, the Brčko District police, and the State Border Service (SBS). Excluded from the analysis were the SIPA, Interpol, and the Court Police. As SBS is a newly created unit, its assessment was done separately.

#### Two complementary research teams

Constitution of 2 teams of complementary experts with corresponding specialities: a financial team and an organisational team + an expert on border guards

#### The method for the data collection

A combination of two complementary methodological approaches, a quantitative and a qualitative one

#### The quantitative methodology

- Quantitative Strategic Performance Indicators (SPI) were initially constructed for each process studied
- 3 questionnaires (finance, organisational and border guards) were designed to collect (mainly) quantitative data necessary to document the strategic performance indicators on the units of analysis
- The questionnaires were sent to all 14 LEAs and MoIs

#### The qualitative methodology

All teams conducted field visits and made semi-structured interviews with operational heads of processes in order to document more in depth the processes under study.

- The financial team visited all 14 MoIs and interviewed senior officials in the MoI and the MoF- Treasury, focusing on
  - Budgeting
  - Controlling
  - Sustainability
- The organisational team selected 6 LEAs, namely the Cantons of Tuzla, Sarajevo and Mostar, the Banja Luka PSC, Brčko District and the Federation level, and conducted interviews with operational heads of the following processes:
  - **operational:** local police station, police at direction level, traffic police, crime investigation, crowd control

- **support:** human resources, control rooms, management, training
- The SBS was interviewed by both teams on financial and organisational issues with regard to their special remit, which is different from the other studied LEAs

**Participatory approach:** Workshops and meetings of the Steering Committee

### **Benchmark on the SPI and best practices**

The assessment uses comparative data on the SPI and the best practices in two main types of States:

- 4 European *federal or strongly decentralised* States
  - The Netherlands
  - Germany
  - Belgium
  - Switzerland

In all these States, the State level accounts for about 10% of all police forces, while the decentralised units comprise about 90% of the forces (= similarity with BiH). The Netherlands have 25 regional units (regions), Germany 16 (Länder) and Switzerland 26 (Cantons). Belgium has over 100 local units (called the intercommunal zones or ZIP).

- 2 *transition* countries *accessing EU membership in 2004*
  - Slovenia
  - Hungary

While centralised, these 2 States have become EU members in May 2004 and their practices are relevant as intermediary steps towards European standards.

## 1.4 The clusters

Figures from 2002			
	number of police personnel <sup>1</sup>	number of inhabitants per km <sup>2</sup>	number of inhabitants per officer
<b>Federation</b>			
<b>Sarajevo 1.1</b>	1,559	314	289
<b>Tuzla 1.2</b>	1,723	193	327
<b>Zenica 1.3</b>	1,452	119	323
<b>Mostar 2.1</b>	1,050	50	219
<b>Bihać 2.2</b>	1,025	75	336
<b>Travnik 2.3</b>	944	76	284
<b>Livno 3.1</b>	419	17	239
<b>Ljubuški 3.2</b>	312	60	310
<b>Goražde 3.3</b>	226	70	166
<b>Orašje 3.4</b>	180	134	252
<b>Federation police</b>	684		
<b>total Federation</b>	9,574	89	242
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	6,267	43.1	185
<b>Brčko District</b>	307	193	350

<sup>1</sup> As police personnel were counted the authorised, specially authorised and administrative personnel of the police (excluding the administrative personnel of the Ministry of Interior). Population data in the Federation is based on 2003 data provided by the Statistical office of the Federation; Population data for the RS is based on UNDP 2003 figures.

For presentation and analysis purposes, the cantonal police forces were regrouped in 3 clusters that combine the size of the police force and the density of the cantonal population. Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica are the largest cantonal police forces in relatively urbanised areas. The next three cantons have a force of around 1000 officers but in mainly rural areas. The last four Cantons have the smallest forces in mostly rural areas (except for Orašje). A similar clustering of the Public Security Centres in the RS was not possible due to the lack of data made available by the RS.

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Police Assessment – a System Approach

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## 2 THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

### 2.1 Products

#### The six operative processes and products



- For the analysis, we distinguished 6 types of operative products and processes which in principle require a specific organisation, a certain profile of personnel, appropriate training and methods.
- For each product, we have identified the key elements constitutive of the best practices of the process leading to the product and illustrated them with examples in benchmarking countries.
- Based on these key elements and best practices, we assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the process as implemented in the units of analysis, and provided the supportive figures.

### 2.1.1 Local Policing

#### Best practice

- A locally-based and managed process (cities, municipalities)
- A process focusing on petty criminality, anti-social behaviour (public order), subjective feeling of security and quality of life
- A consultation with the local public to diagnose security problems and local satisfaction with police services (community meetings, surveys)
- A systematic analysis of data on security problems to diagnose objective security
- A partnership with local administration and civil society to solve security problems
- A service by all-round officers, with special skills in problem-solving, social skills, prevention, and abilities to work with partners to co-produce security
- There are various indicators for the quality of local security: level of public order problems, subjective feeling of insecurity, public satisfaction with the quality of police service (police image), victim satisfaction

#### *The example of local policing in France and Belgium*

- Each municipality (or association of municipalities) has a **Local Council of Security** with, as core members, the chief of the local police, the local prosecutor and the mayor or *préfet*. The Council is responsible for the formulation of policy orientations for the local policing
- To define strategic and operational goals, the Local Council of Security elaborates a so-called **Local Security Diagnosis** which, via **consultations and analysis**, reports periodically (every three years) on the local security situation (objective and subjective).
- Based on the Local Diagnosis and with the assistance of various partners (such as the school, social and health services, civil society associations), the police defines **security goals** and elaborates **action plans** that are formally translated into contracts (the **Local Security Contract**) where all the participating partners define the actions and measures that they will undertake to reach their goals (the **public safety plan**).
- The partners meet on a regular basis to control and review the progress of their actions and solve problems.

As a result, in addition to their work on daily security incidents and problems, the police increasingly works with strategic and operational planning in partnership with other important actors of society to co-produce the local security today.

The local policing in Great Britain, the Netherlands or Switzerland, to give a few examples, operates with similar mechanisms today.

## SWOT

### Strengths

- Good subjective level of security. In both Entities, the level of subjective security is better than in Slovenia in 1996 or Poland in 2000 (see table)
- An average of 64.8% of BiH residents are very or rather satisfied with the work of the police; the corresponding figure is much lower (38%) in countries with a similar human development index, according to International Victimization Surveys,.
- Good visible presence of uniformed officer on the beat
- Petty crime under control
- First pilot projects in the Federation and the RS at municipal level of community policing (ATOS/KPMG project)

<b>Subjective security</b>		<b>LOCAL POLICING</b>	
<i>(all data come from primary analysis of International Crime Victimization Surveys</i>			
<i>(source: UNICRI, Milan; TC Team Consult)</i>			
<b>Entities</b>	<b>year of survey</b>	<b>percentage of population feeling very or rather safe walking alone in their living area after dark</b>	
<b>Federation</b>	2001	74.2	
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	2001	77.1	
<b>BiH (total)</b>		75	
<b>The Netherlands</b>	2000	81	
<b>Belgium</b>	2000	77	
<b>Switzerland</b>	2000	77	
<b>Slovenia</b>	1996	71.8	
<b>Poland</b>	1996	64	
<b>Poland</b>	2000	64	




## Weaknesses

- Heavily (over-) staffed process. The local police stations in the Federation have an average of 1 police officer for 446 inhabitants. In the urbanised area of Brčko District, the ratio is 1 officer for 633 inhabitants. The European standards are about 1 officer for 1000 in urban areas and 1 for 2000 in rural areas. While no data was available for the police stations in the RS, our field visits indicate that the situation is very similar to the Federation.

<b>Data from year 2002</b>	<b>local policing</b>
<b>Federation</b>	<b>TOTAL RATIO</b>
<b>Sarajevo</b>	<b>1.1</b> 902 445
<b>Tuzla</b>	<b>1.2</b> 1'117 457
<b>Zenica</b>	<b>1.3</b> 878 454
<b>Mostar</b>	<b>2.1</b> 679 321
<b>Bihac</b>	<b>2.2</b> 666 462
<b>Travnik</b>	<b>2.3</b> 642 375
<b>Livno</b>	<b>3.1</b> 172 487
<b>Ljubuski</b>	<b>3.2</b> 114 714
<b>Gorazde</b>	<b>3.3</b> 132 267
<b>Orasje</b>	<b>3.4</b> 90 484
<b>total Federation</b>	<b>5'392 446</b>
<b>Brčko</b>	<b>150 633</b>

## Local Policing



- The uniformed police officers in the local police stations have too few competences (no investigative competence on petty crime and often no registration of victims' reports)
- Skills of all-round officers are underused (motivation!)
- Community policing practices not yet deployed (consultation, victim assistance, partnership, problem-solving, public safety plans)
- Presence (in shifts) not always adapted to reality of security problems.

## 2.1.2 *Rapid Intervention*

### **Best practice**

- One (European) emergency number 112
- Guaranteed short intervention times
- Service 24/24
- Specific division with high productivity and mobility (or mobile response patrol units integrated in the local police stations)
- Technology-based regional operation (control) rooms with trained operators
- Integrated control rooms (fire services, ambulance, police)
- Operators in the control rooms directly engage police patrols in the field
- (Digital network for communication)


### **Some strategic indicators**

- Control room capacities (population size covered by one control room) vary greatly in Europe. However, a good size is 1 control room per 700,000 people.
- In Slovenia and in the Canton of Vaud (CH), there is an average per day and per 100,000 inhabitants of respectively 24 and 26 police interventions (see table next page). In other words, this corresponds to an average of about 1 intervention every hour per 100,000 inhabitants (or 7 per 700,000 inhabitants every hour). The number of alarm calls is 2 to 3 times this figure.
- In the heavily urban Land of Berlin (3,500,000 inhabitants), there is one single control room handling about 2,000 calls per day and 800 interventions per day.
- The indicator of quality of the product is the response time calculated as the duration between the emergency call and the arrival of the first police patrol on the location of the incident. Today, the European police forces set the targets of 5 minutes in urban areas and 20 minutes in rural areas.
  - In the benchmarking countries, Slovenia has an average response time of 16 minutes countrywide.
  - In Hungary, the estimated response time is 18 minutes in an urban area and 45 minutes in a rural area.
  - In the Swiss Canton of Vaud, the average response time in an urban area is 5 minutes and 20 minutes in the rural areas (see table next page).

**SWOT**

**Strengths**

- There is one national emergency number (122)
- The (estimated) average response time in BiH is close to EU police forces standards and, on average, better than in Hungary



<b>CALL RESPONSE</b>		<b>2.11 Product</b>	
<b>Figures from 2003</b>		<b>RAPID INTERVENTION</b>	
<b>Estimated figures in minutes</b>	<b>response time for emergency</b>	<b>average duration of intervention</b>	<b>average duration of intervention (heavy cases)</b>
<b>Federation</b>	<b>urban</b>	<b>rural</b>	
<i>Sarajevo</i>	1.1	...	...
<i>Tuzla</i>	1.2	8	22.5
<i>Zenica</i>	1.3	10	30
<i>Mostar</i>	2.1	7.5	30
<i>Bihać</i>	2.2	10	25
<i>Travnik</i>	2.3	5	15
<i>Livno</i>	3.1	7.5	17.5
<i>Ljubuški</i>	3.2	10	22.5
<i>Goražde</i>	3.3	5	32.5
<i>Orašje</i>	3.4	7.5	20.0
<i>mean Total Federation</i>	7.8	23.9	53.75
<b>Brčko District</b>	5	20	35
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	10	50	...
<b>Benchmarking</b>			
<b>Canton of Vaud</b>	5	20	
<b>Slovenia</b>		16	
<b>Hungary</b>	18	45	

**Emergency calls (control room)**

Figures from 2003		2.1.2 Product <b>RAPID INTERVENTION</b>		
Federation	number of 122 calls per 24 hours	number of 122 calls per 24 hours with intervention	122 calls per 100,000 inhabitants	122 calls with intervention per 100,000 inh.
<b>Sarajevo</b> 1.1				
<b>Tuzla</b> 1.2	104	80	20.38	15,68
<b>Zenica</b> 1.3	39	39	9.78	9,78
<b>Mostar</b> 2.1	356	4	163.30	1,83
<b>Bihać</b> 2.2	17	11	5.53	3,58
<b>Travnik</b> 2.3	33	15	13.70	6,23
<b>Livno</b> 3.1	6	6	7.17	7,17
<b>Ljubuški</b> 3.2	24	13	29.48	15,97
<b>Goražde</b> 3.3	2.6	1.6	7.38	4,54
<b>Orašje</b> 3.4				
<b>mean Total Federation</b>	72.7	21.2	31	9.04
<b>Brčko District</b>	6.2	6.1	6.5	6.4
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	43.49	35.23	3.9	3.2
<b>Benchmark</b>				
<b>Slovenia</b>	1526	464	78	24
<b>Land of Berlin</b>	4207	2041	832	58
<b>Canton of Vaud (Switzerland)</b>		164		26

**Weaknesses**

- Outdated technology for control rooms (most rudimentary communication means)
- Too many local control rooms, very consuming in staff (in the Federation alone approximately 300 officers authorised to run the local control rooms 24/24). While we do not possess the corresponding figures for the RS, the situation seems similar.
- The control room of Goražde handles on average 1.6 interventions per day! This figure in itself is a call for the creation of regional (supra-Cantonal) control rooms; on the other hand, a canton such as Tuzla, with over 500,000 inhabitants, reaches the threshold for a cantonal control room (about 80 interventions per day).
- Intervention patrols are engaged by the shift leader, not the operator in the control room
- Insufficient mobility with, in most LEAs, an outdated vehicle park
- There is no specific division dealing with emergency calls at cantonal or PSC level. Instead, different divisions respond to emergency calls depending on their competencies: accidents are responded to mostly by the traffic unit, while other calls are responded to by the local police stations.

### 2.1.3 Combating Crime

#### Best practice

- An organisation at 3 different levels (depending on nature of crime):
  - Local police station (petty crimes, increasingly by uniformed police, soft specialisation)
  - Regional (serious crimes by crime inspectors and specialists)
  - National (complex, organised, international or inter-regional crimes, by police specialists and experts)
- Regional forensic science services (photographs, finger prints), observation teams, special support teams (arrest, hostage, terror)
- Regional or central task forces (with external partners) or special (internal) commissions on a project basis for special crimes
- Centralised services (specialised expertise and forensic services, protection of witnesses, international cooperation)
- A highly efficient computerised information system (search, register, documents), centrally managed with quick and easy access and local inputs
- A centralised service for crime intelligence (= analysis and knowledge management)
- Delegation and selection right by higher crime police in cascade on a case-by-case basis

#### The cases of Berlin and of the Canton of Vaud (CH)

- The case of the Land of Berlin (3.5 Mio inhabitants = size of BiH, but a small, very densely populated area and a total of 24,152 police officers (including the administrative personnel) in 2003)
  - 55% of all crimes (petty to serious crimes) are investigated by the uniformed police with a soft specialisation
  - 30% of all crimes (serious) are investigated by territorial directorates
  - 15% of all crimes (complex) are investigated by the Crime agency at the Land level (*Landeskriminalamt*) or by other authorities such as the Crime agency at the Federal level (*Bundeskriminalamt*) and the State Border Service (BGS).
- The Swiss case (7,000,000 inhabitants)
  - All petty crimes (incl. theft) are investigated by the uniformed police at the police station level
  - Serious crimes (including robberies, blood crimes) are investigated at the Cantonal level
  - Complex crimes (organised crime, financial crimes, human trafficking, terrorism, etc.) are investigated at the national level by the Swiss federal police



## Strengths

- Good investigation success rate (an average of 55.1% for BiH); in comparison, the Land of Berlin has a 52% success rate; the Land of Rheinland-Pfalz 57.7%.
- Relatively low criminality levels (see next table). However blood crimes, complex crimes such as corruption and organised crime are or are estimated to be high. In BiH there are 6.2 blood crimes per 100,000 inhabitants compared to 2.5 in Hungary or 0.8 in Slovenia.
- New national investigation division (SIPA) for complex, international or inter-regional crimes
- Initial steps in managing information (ICITAP, OHR, EU) centrally; deployment started (see chapter on information systems)
- Many specialisation courses organised by the international community


<b>Success rate</b>	<b>2.13 product</b>
<b>Figures from 2003</b>	<b>Combating Crime</b>
	<b>percentage of crime solved</b>
<b>Federation</b>	
<b>Sarajevo 1.1</b>	53.5
<b>Tuzla 1.2</b>	60.5
<b>Zenica 1.3</b>	63.1
<b>Mostar 2.1</b>	64.0
<b>Bihać 2.2</b>	58.0
<b>Travnik 2.3</b>	64.0
<b>Livno 3.1</b>	58.7
<b>Ljubuški 3.2</b>	58.0
<b>Goražde 3.3</b>	88.5
<b>Orašje 3.4</b>	65.4
<b>Total Federation</b>	<b>63.4</b>
<b>Brčko District</b>	<b>50.0</b>
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	<b>52.0</b>

<b>Victimisation rates for 4 crimes</b>		<b>2.13 Product</b>			
		<b>Combating Crime</b>			
<i>(all data come from primary analysis of International Crime Victimization Surveys (source: UNICRI, Milan, TC Team Consult))</i>					
<b>Percentage of inhabitants who were victims in the past year of</b>					
	<b>year of survey</b>	<b>car theft</b>	<b>burglary</b>	<b>robbery</b>	<b>property theft</b>
<b>Federation</b>	2001	0.7	1.5	0.6	2.2
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	2001	0.4	1.1	0.1	1.5
<b>BiH (total)</b>		0.6	1.3	0.4	2
<b>Belgium</b>	2000	0.7	2	1	4.1
<b>Slovenia</b>	1996	0.3	2.3	1.2	3.4
<b>Poland</b>	1996	0.8	2.1	1.8	5.4

### Weaknesses

- Too many levels of crime combating by the 14 police forces. In the Federation, there are 5 levels at which crime is combated: the police station (by lower rank crime inspectors), the police direction level (= *uprava* level), the Cantonal level, the Federation level and, finally, the State level. This complicated hierarchy and fragmentation often provokes conflicts/confusion of competences, redundancies and, in the absence of an efficient information and intelligence system linking the levels, does not provide the basis for a vision on the reality of crime. This system urgently needs to be simplified in both dimensions (vertical and horizontal).

- There are detached crime inspectors at all levels of the police organisation, (over-specialisation when compared to best practices: the uniformed police should deal with petty crime at police station level).
- Low or no inter-regional (Cantonal or Entity) cooperation in the form of task forces or special commissions working on a project basis
- Basic training missing for crime inspectors in the Federation. There is no specific training programme for the crime inspectors who work at the police station level under the rank of junior inspector. In the Republika Srpska, a 4-month training programme for uniformed police officers who join the crime department guarantees the transition. Some interviewed inspectors explained that they received a sharp training in specific crimes (for instance blood crime) but are ‘illiterate’ on other crime issues.
- Lack of global vision on training needs (no global offer either).
- Necessity to increase the responsibilities and independence of crime investigators against their own hierarchy. The practice in Western Europe is that an inspector in charge of a case interacts directly with the prosecutor in charge and transmits his closing report directly to him; in BiH (both the RS and the Federation), all closing reports are signed (at least) by the territorial chief (*Upravna* level) who, in general, is a uniformed police officer!
- Crime intelligence services missing at national and regional level (SIPA will partially change this situation)
- Architecture for a central information system still missing (see support process on information).



## 2.1.4 Crowd Control

### Best practices

Crowd control is an area of police force specialisation. Crowd control units deal with large gatherings with a potential of violent escalation (sports events, mass protest, etc.). The units dealing with crowd control need:

- To be specially equipped (self-protection, coercive means and vehicles)
- To have their personnel regularly and specially trained
- To apply de-escalation tactics
- To be inter-operable
- Legal provisions for mutual support mechanisms between the federal regional units need to be in place in federal countries

In terms of organisation, broadly speaking two models exist:


- A separate division (France) of professionals with crowd control as core mission
- A ‘militia system’ with specially trained personnel working primarily in various regular police processes but who can be mobilised for crowd control events on short notice (Switzerland)

<b>SUPPORT UNIT</b>	2.14 product	
<b>Figures from 2003</b>	<b>CROWD CONTROL</b>	
	yearly number of large events	yearly number of events with support unit
<b>Federation</b>		
<b>Sarajevo 1.1</b>	...	
<b>Tuzla 1.2</b>	2.481	5
<b>Zenica 1.3</b>	672	20
<b>Mostar 2.1</b>	911	48
<b>Bihać 2.2</b>	720	155
<b>Travnik 2.3</b>	747	8
<b>Livno 3.1</b>	188	4
<b>Ljubuški 3.2</b>	288	86
<b>Goražde 3.3</b>	161	5
<b>Orašje 3.4</b>	356	42
<b>Total Federation</b>	6524	373
<i>(without Sarajevo)</i>		
<b>Brčko District</b>	67	27
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	...	...

### Strengths

- Crowd control as a specialisation process exists
- The specialised personnel working in the process are well trained and properly equipped

### Crowd Control



### Weaknesses

- The support units are highly decentralised. In the Federation for instance, they are organised at Cantonal level which is too small in small Cantons. As a consequence, these decentralised units are at best rarely used or used in non-core operations (where they are not primarily trained).
- For instance, in Goražde and Livno, the support units were engaged respectively 5 and 4 times in 2003!
- The model –separate divisions – is expensive and not flexible
- Often in-service training (low capacity in police academy)
- Lack of adequate control rooms
- Low inter-operability inter-regionally: while the support units operate with harmonised instructions, they use different communication systems
- Missing mutual legally binding agreement of support between the Entities, Brčko District and the Cantons.
- Outside the support units, the uniformed police who take part in the control of large crowds is neither equipped nor adequately trained



## 2.1.5 Traffic Policing

time spent by activities of traffic police										2.15 product
Figures from 2003										TRAFFIC POLICING
all figures in %	dealing with			traffic control	escort	traffic regulation	adminis- tration	others	total	
	accident	traffic	control							
<b>Federation</b>										
<b>Sarajevo</b>	<b>1.1</b>	1.1	82.0	0	1.6	12.6	2.7	100		
<b>Tuzla</b>	<b>1.2</b>	32	31	4	11	10	14	100		
<b>Zenica</b>	<b>1.3</b>	20	35	15	15	10	5	100		
<b>Mostar</b>	<b>2.1</b>	30	20	5	5	20	20	100		
<b>Bihać</b>	<b>2.2</b>	20	47	3	15	10	5	100		
<b>Travnik</b>	<b>2.3</b>	10	40	10	20	20	0	100		
<b>Livno</b>	<b>3.1</b>	30	40	10	5	5	10	100		
<b>Ljubuški</b>	<b>3.2</b>	15	50	5	10	20	0	100		
<b>Goražde</b>	<b>3.3</b>	5	5	10	5	70	5	100		
<b>Orašje</b>	<b>3.4</b>	30				50	20	100		
<b>mean Federation</b>		19.3	35.0	6.1	8.7	22.7	8.2	100		
<b>Brčko District</b>		20	60	0	5	10	5	100		
<b>Republika Srpska</b>										

In BiH, except for the Cantons of Tuzla and Travnik, there is a special division which deals with traffic matters. The main functions of this division are to respond to and investigate road accidents (about 20% of their time) and to control and regulate the traffic (about 50% of their time). Within the traffic division, there are units specialised in dealing with heavy car accidents and equipped accordingly.

<b>Road accident ratio</b>		<b>2.15 product</b>		
Figures from 2003		<b>TRAFFIC POLICING</b>		
		mean number of inhabitants per car	number of accidents with fatalities per 100,000 inh.	number of accidents with wounded per 100,000 inh.
<b>Federation</b>				
<i>Sarajevo</i>	<b>1.1</b>	...	7.5	215
<i>Tuzla</i>	<b>1.2</b>	4.0	8.6	178
<i>Zenica</i>	<b>1.3</b>	5.4	11.5	175
<i>Mostar</i>	<b>2.1</b>	5.7	8.3	268
<i>Bihać</i>	<b>2.2</b>	4.1	9.4	167
<i>Travnik</i>	<b>2.3</b>	6.0	16.2	270
<i>Livno</i>	<b>3.1</b>	5.4	9.6	292
<i>Ljubuški</i>	<b>3.2</b>	3.2	19.7	421
<i>Goražde</i>	<b>3.3</b>	7.6	5.7	96
<i>Orašje</i>	<b>3.4</b>	3.8	9.2	190
<b>mean Total Federation</b>		5.0	10.6	227
<b>Brčko District</b>		3.1	8.4	198
<b>Republika Srpska</b>		5.1	16.2	201
<b>Benchmark (figures from 2003)</b>				
<i>Germany</i>			8.3	
<i>Hungary</i>			12.3	179
<i>Slovenia</i>			12.2	507
<i>Netherlands</i>			6.1	
<i>Austria</i>			11.9	
<i>Switzerland</i>			7.1	
<i>France</i>			12.1	


### Strengths

- In general efficient and well-organised division
- Relatively short response time for accidents
- Specialised unit for heavy accidents (equipped and trained)
- In recent cases, practise of prosecutor to delegate authority of investigation of heavy accidents to police
- Average rate of accidents (but high compared to number of registered cars)

### Weaknesses

- Aged vehicle park impeding adequate mobility
- No adequate control room
- Too specialised jurisdiction (should evolve into a rapid intervention division)
- Traffic regulation and control should be re-allocated to local police stations (better integration in local policing)

### Traffic Policing




### **2.1.6 Border Guarding**

The LEA responsible for border guarding in BiH, the State Border Service (SBS), is quite different from the other studied LEAs, which makes it necessary to discuss the assessment of the present situation in certain areas (products, support processes / organisation, human resources) separately rather than together with the findings for the other LEAs in order to ensure better legibility of this report, please refer to chapter 2.5 below. Other topics (those related to finance, i.e. budgeting, controlling, sustainability) lend themselves more easily to an integrated approach due to fewer specificities and higher similarity in findings, thus the general chapter on finance applies also to SBS.

## 2.2 Support Processes - Organisation

### 2.2.1 The Process Model



## 2.2.2 Management Processes

### Best practice

- Clear separation between political supervision and operational management.
  - Political supervision means
    - Public security policy (e.g. balance between the different products and the main objectives)
    - Budget frame
    - Political coordination with other ministries
    - Selection of police Commissioners, following transparent rules
  - Operational management means
    - Best use of people, equipment and finances available to reach the given objectives
- Operational management works out a written and deployed mission statement and ‘Common Cause’, implements a long term strategy on products, processes, people and finances, and systematically controls the attained results.
- At all management levels, precise objectives are set and followed within a framework of large delegation and empowerment
- Operational management includes budget responsibility and budget autonomy


### SWOT

#### Strengths

In a few cases strategic objectives are listed

#### Weaknesses

- For the most part, no clear separation between political supervision and operational management
- No written and deployed mission, strategies and controlling
- No measurable objectives with clear priorities
- Delegation and empowerment are not well developed
- Operational management has no budget autonomy and responsibility





### 2.2.3 Information and Communication Process

#### Best practice

- The best practice is that all police stations and units (including the border guards) are linked to a single electronic database network. Important information is to be fed into the system, at a central and decentralised level in a structured form and according to fixed rules, so as to be available for the execution of the police tasks.
- Independent of a global concept, a *first essential building block* in such a police database system is a centralised information system (CIS) of hard (confirmed) data (with possibilities for input, search and deletion) which contains: All the persons known by the police to have been proved guilty of criminal acts, as well as the results of the identification procedures (for instance finger prints, domicile, etc), searched persons, and searched goods.
- A *second building block* is a database containing pertinent information for the police on goods, objects, institutions, information, cases and documentation of identification (such as fingerprints, photographs, etc.) that can be accessed in a decentralised way by authorised personnel
- A next building block contains the following elements:
  - An extranet for the exchange of soft information (for instance, situation analyses, information from the hierarchy, etc.),
  - A system networking all procedural elements linked to persons such as verdicts and police reports (including the access to justice registers)
  - The contemporary battle against crime requires ‘decentralised analysis units’ responsible for the ‘operational’ evaluation (investigation-supporting and investigation-initiating), and ‘central analysis units’ responsible for the ‘strategic’ evaluation (management information, in support of police management strategy and home affairs policy development).
  - Data processing systems are required for the documentation and evaluation of extensive preliminary investigations with a multiplicity of information. The functions necessary for such a system are :
    - the information search
    - the information storage (e.g. database systems)
    - the evaluation (analysis tools)
    - the visualisation of analysis results and
    - the communication of information between the analysis units (e.g. by intranet).

- In order to perform identification and control, the police must also receive information from various general administration agencies, e.g. registration office, driving licence register, motor vehicle file, etc., without delay..
- The interfaces in the data processing systems of international institutions for prosecution must be defined.
- Information systems require:
  - clear responsibilities for the use, execution, servicing, access, maintenance, setup of the existing network and of the database network to be created
  - the creation of an international standard of appropriate data protection law
  - a financial concept
  - the training and advanced training of co-workers of the police force

## SWOT

- The data network created with the assistance of the international community, which should connect municipalities in BiH, but not all police stations (this should take place until the end of 2005), is a substantial condition for a database network. Specialists should examine whether it corresponds to all technical requirements.
- With regard to the first building block of a police data system, it appears that this block is still under development but only partially conceptualised. It will contain identification possibilities (the link to the CIPS – passports, ID cards, vehicle and person register); it will contain an access to INTERPOL data and some other identification data such as finger prints (EU currently finances an AFIS project – automatic fingerprint identification system – as well as the creation of a DNA databank). However, an integrated search system for nationally and internationally wanted persons and goods still seems to be missing.
- With regard to the second building-block, the data systems planned for the police and the SBS – the Standardised Police Reporting System (SPRS) – will cover a part of the police requirements. In particular, there will be a need to develop this system so as to include information on objects, institutions and to develop the documentation of identification (photographs, etc.). Currently, the EU finances a project for creation of a databank on weapons.
- With regard to the last building-block, there is a project to introduce an intelligence analysis system (a so-called 4 by 4 system) and some police forces have initiated steps to develop their own crime mapping system (for instance Mostar). The ICITAP/OHR project will provide for an important and useful link to criminal justice registers and documents. The EU plans to finance the establishment of a


- crime analysis network (with the corresponding software). Intranet solutions have yet to be developed to link police agencies; crime analysis tools are not available.
- Finally, to allow for a rapid communication and access from the field to the various data bases and systems, the EU is currently assessing the possibility to develop a communication system via satellite. Such a system must be evaluated under two crucial criteria: the security of the communication and the operating costs (known to be high in satellite communication).

### Strengths

- There are several complementary initiatives that will provide the various police units with a single data base and system considered to be critical for the performance of all agencies. The establishment of a single (national) secure communication network by ICITAP and OHR linking police stations constitute one of the fundamental bases for all other projects. The next step will be to allow the field patrols to communicate or quickly and efficiently access these data bases and systems.
- Many systems are currently developed or implemented *on a national basis*: CIPS project, SRPS, AFIS, 4 by 4 Crime intelligence.
- The individual activities of particular police officers and of some organisational units

### Weaknesses

- Currently, there is no single information system for BiH to cover the most basic police needs. The only national register currently available to police forces is the vehicle register.
- The technical means for communication are outdated and not efficient.
- Insufficiently systematised information exchange
- The identification of complex connections between crimes and the crime structure, particularly on supra-regional, national and international levels, is extremely difficult
- No quick access to information
- The flow of important information and the selection of important data are not mastered
- Uneconomical working manner; there is an enormous amount of duplication, all agencies (and often police stations) having to create their own data system. The existing system is very consuming in staff, energy and, finally, unproductive.
- The data available is highly unreliable (in stations often on CD Roms and not correctly updated)
- For the future, and taking into consideration the projects of the international community, a clear architecture



for the information system should be developed so as to meet the basic needs of police and guarantee that all requirements of the first building-block of a police information system are met. In particular, a simple single integrated search system needs to be in place as quickly as possible.

## 2.2.4 Logistics

### Best practice

- Operational and support equipment follows technological progress and gives optimal support to highly qualified personnel
- Investments and maintenance have to be planned on a long term basis
- Common procurement for heavy investments (cars, information technology, communication systems, weapons, uniforms etc) allows inter-operability and economies of scale


### SWOT

#### Strengths

- Thanks to international help, logistics are partly modernised
- Basic elements of a long-term plan exist at EUPM/EC

#### Weaknesses

- Still numerous equipment with outdated technology; Absence of modern equipment is partly compensated by overstaffing
- Very limited local investment possibilities due to lack of finances
- Difficulties to assure training and maintenance for donated modern equipment and systems
- Current local and isolated procurement does not provide a basis for inter-operability
- No central agency or even common platform between all LEAs where technical specifications for necessary inter-operable equipment are discussed and decided upon.



Procurement units exist within all of the 14 Law Enforcement Agencies visited, which considering the total value of goods/services sourced by the Ministries of Interior/SBS are at best extreme and do not obtain VFM (value for money). This situation is not sustainable and leads to the procurement of goods/services with a higher unit cost price than would be available if centralised bulk purchasing was introduced throughout BiH for the Police/SBS.

### 2.2.5 The Overall Organisation

#### Best practice

- Organisation is clearly strategy-, process- and product- oriented
- Centralisation and decentralisation follow a clear client orientation, and an efficiency and cost logic
- Productivity per product is measured and systematically improved
- Ratio police officers – administrative personnel is in good balance
- Organisation facilitates work with partners
- Standards and doctrine are elaborated centrally with consultation mechanisms


#### SWOT

##### Strengths

- Cantons as geographical units (and to a lesser extent PSCs) form a good base to develop local / community policing, which needs to be more integrated however into municipal governance
- Creation of new and essential national units like SBS, SIPA, Interpol

##### Weaknesses

- Current organisation is not (or very little) strategy-, process- and product- oriented.
  - Local policing needs a stronger integration in local governance institutions
  - Rapid intervention, crime specialists, crowd control units, needs to be organised at a




regional level (many small Cantons are too small)



- Vital central functions are missing
  - Common information- and communication systems
  - Common selection- and training units
  - Common procurement unit
  - Common technical support units
- Decentralisation is not developed enough in the RS; PSCs should be reorganised regionally and local policing in the RS better integrated in the local governance institutions
- Productivity is not evaluated and improved
- Ratio police officers – administrative personnel is not in good balance; this is true if the administrative personnel working on the police matters at the MoIs is taken into account
- Organisation only partially facilitates working with partners (e.g. Cantons)



### 2.3 The Human Resources Dimension



### 2.3.1 Overall Staffing



#### Best practice

- Well trained and motivated personnel is the most important requirement for successful police work, but also the most important cost factor (in average 70-80% of total costs). Therefore human resources need a careful strategic planning and controlling.
- Overall staffing follows clear principles:
  - Police-population density per product
  - Police-population density per type of area (urban/rural)
- Overall staffing is based (and depends) on mobility and technology factors
- Overall staffing tends to create sound age structures
- In case of overstaffing, medium and long term strategies are developed, taking into account the interests of the organisation as well as the interests of the individual

Some examples of overall staffing in benchmarking countries

<b>Benchmark Police staff per type of area</b>	<b>2.31 PROCESS</b>		<b>HUMAN RESOURCES</b>	
	<b>number of police personnel</b>	<b>number of inhabitants per km2</b>	<b>number of inhabitants per officer</b>	<b>number of inhabitants per officer</b>
<b>Switzerland (examples)</b>				
Bâle-Ville <b>1</b>	829	5050	225	225
Vaud <b>2.1</b>	1752	195	374	374
Lucerne <b>2.2</b>	711	236	495	495
Valais <b>3.1</b>	583	54	482	482
Soleure <b>3.2</b>	414	311	595	595
Jura <b>3.3</b>	137	82	505	505
<b>Netherlands (examples)</b>				
Amsterdam <b>1.1</b>	5834	2558	172	172
Rotterdam <b>1.2</b>	5442	1017	232	232
the Haag <b>1.3</b>	4543	785	206	206
Twente <b>2.1</b>	1485	407	396	396
Brabant-Noord <b>2.2</b>	1354	450	421	421
Drenthe <b>3.1</b>	1074	177	438	438
Zeeland <b>3.2</b>	941	128	395	395

<b>Countries (including border guards and State level)</b>			
	Total police	Number of inhabitants per km2	Number of inhabitants per officer
<b>Netherlands</b>	47,964	388	339
<b>Belgium</b>	44,067	337	234
<b>Germany</b>	270,000	231	305
<b>Hungary</b>	40,026	113	257
<b>Slovenia</b>	8,907	97	220
<b>BIH</b>			
<b>BIH (incl. Mol, SBS, SIPA and Interpol)</b>	18,295	66	234
	23,500	66	145

The Netherlands and Switzerland are relevant as benchmarks as, at the State level, the State police accounts for about 10% of all forces. The rest, 90% of the police forces, is distributed in the regions and Cantons respectively. The figure shows that in densely populated areas the ratio is about 200 inhabitants per officer, while in the more rural areas the ratio is one officer per 400-500 inhabitants. However, the country benchmark shows that transition countries accessing to EU membership have a higher police density. Hungary has a ratio of 1 officer for 257 inhabitants and Slovenia of 1 officer for 220 inhabitants.

## SWOT


### Strengths

- Initial strategies for overall staffing (mainly reduction of police officers) have been developed and implemented.


### Weaknesses

- Overall staffing does not follow clear and transparent principles as explained in detail in the products assessment (see tables commented on next pages)
  - Most (rural) areas are overstaffed
  - Rapid intervention is understaffed (but heavily overstaffed control rooms)
  - Local policing is heavily overstaffed
  - Crowd control is overstaffed in some rural areas
  - SBS is still under-staffed

- The current 5936 civil personnel in the MOIs account in BiH for 26.2% of all staff (not including SIPA). In international comparison, this figure is an average. Benchmarking figures are about 30% for Great Britain, 25.9 in Hungary, 20.8 for Slovenia. However, if we add these figures to the authorised personnel, we arrive at a grand total of about 23,500 personnel (including SIPA this time) working for the police in BiH, or 1 police personnel for 145 inhabitants, which is a ratio far higher than any of the benchmarking countries. In Slovenia it is 1 police personnel for 220, in Hungary 1 for 257, in Germany 1 for 300. While in relative terms the percentage of civil servants is average, in absolute terms there are too many civil servants working for the police today.



**Numbers within age structures for operational Police/SBS officers as at 31-12-03.**



In addition:

- the present age structure is not sound (see figure above)
- There is a very limited mobility and the technology is in general outdated
- There is no long term strategy to decrease the number of police officers taking into account the social and political aspects and the age structure of the police
- There is a very low percentage of female officers (~ 4%) compared to leading European police forces today such as the Netherlands (18%). In Slovenia, the percentage is 8.3%.
- Only a few cantons / districts have multi-ethnic force; most LEAs are more or less highly homogenous.



The problem of police density: no clear principles applied

<b>Police staff per type of area</b>		<b>HUMAN RESOURCES</b>	
<b>Figures from 2002</b>		<b>number of police</b>	<b>number of inhabitants per officer</b>
	<b>Number of inhabitants per km2</b>		
<b>Federation</b>			
<b>Sarajevo 1.1</b>	314	1,559	289
<b>Tuzla 1.2</b>	193	1,723	327
<b>Zenica 1.3</b>	119	1,452	323
<b>Mostar 2.1</b>	50	1,050	219
<b>Bihać 2.2</b>	75	1,025	336
<b>Travnik 2.3</b>	76	944	284
<b>Livno 3.1</b>	17	419	239
<b>Ljubuški 3.2</b>	60	312	310
<b>Goražde 3.3</b>	70	226	166
<b>Orašje 3.4</b>	134	180	252
<b>Federation MOI</b>		684	
<b>total Federation</b>	89	9,574	242
<b>Republika Srpska</b>	43.1	6,267	185
<b>Brčko District</b>	193	307	350
<b>Total BiH excluding civil servants in Mols)</b>			234
<b>Total BiH (including civil servants in Mols</b>			145

In Western democracies, urban areas usually have a high police density. In Dutch regions, the largest cities are very densely populated and have a low ratio of population for 1 officer (around 200 inhabitants for 1 officer). The less urbanised areas, such as Twente or Brabant Noord, which compare to Sarajevo, have a ratio of around 400 inhabitants for 1 officer. The less urbanised areas of the Netherlands have a slightly higher ratio. Swiss cantons show the same pattern: the more urban, the higher density of police. Cross-country, we observe the same pattern: the countries with the highest density of population have comparatively more policemen than countries less populated.

In BiH, there is no general pattern visible. In the Federation, the mean ratio is 1 officer for 242 inhabitants, while in the RS the ratio is even lower: 1 for 185 inhabitants. Only Brčko District has a similar ratio to Swiss cantons or Dutch regions. Moreover, we observe that rural areas, respectively cantons, have, in contrary to the best practices, a lower ratio. There does not seem to be any clear rule regimenting the size of the police force. Adaptation is found to be deficient. Paradoxically, today, BiH is the less densely populated country of the benchmarking list, but one with the highest ratio of policemen. Even compared to other 'transition' (and new member states to the EU) countries such as Slovenia and Hungary, BiH appears to be overstaffed (when civilians working for the police in the Mols are included in the calculation)

The problem (disequilibrium) of allocation of resource in the various police processes.

Human resources allocation in police processes													
		local policing		traffic policing/ rapid intervention		control room		combating crime		crowd control		management of system	
		TOTAL	RATIO	TOTAL	RATIO	TOTAL	RATIO	TOTAL	RATIO	TOTAL	RATIO	TOTAL	RATIO
<b>Federation</b>													
<b>Sarajevo 1.1</b>		902	445	105	3,822	35	11,465	224	1,791	80	5,016	41	9,787
<b>Tuzla 1.2</b>		1,117	457	...	...	41	12,448	302	1,690	75	6,805	30	17,012
<b>Zenica 1.3</b>		878	454	65	6,136	50	7,977	168	2,374	48	8,310	26	15,341
<b>Mostar 2.1</b>		679	321	128	1,703	29	7,518	95	2,295	41	5,317	24	9,084
<b>Bihać 2.2</b>		666	462	35	8,789	35	8,789	75	4,102	63	4,883	42	7,324
<b>Travnik 2.3</b>		642	375	...	...	34	7,087	104	2,317	33	7,302	34	7,087
<b>Livno 3.1</b>		172	487	49	1,709	34	2,463	56	1,495	27	3,101	12	6,978
<b>Ljubuški 3.2</b>		114	714	60	1,357	18	4,523	37	2,200	20	4,071	14	5,815
<b>Goražde 3.3</b>		132	267	17	2,073	7	5,035	28	1,259	18	1,958	10	3,525
<b>Orašje 3.4</b>		90	484	21	2,075	3	14,525	28	1,557	19	2,294	4	10,897
<b>total Federation</b>		5,392	446	480	3,458	286	8,182	1,117	2,108	424	4,905	237	9,284
<b>Brčko District</b>		150	633	40	2,375			41	2,317	30	3,167	10	9,500
<b>Republika Srpska</b>													

This table shows the distribution of resources in the main processes in the Federation and the Brčko District police. No data is available for the RS. The benchmark for the local policing process in Western European police forces is 1 officer for 1,000 inhabitants in urban areas and 1 for 2,000 in rural areas. Local policing in BiH appears to be heavily overstuffed. The control rooms are similarly overstuffed, as are the crowd control support units. The process of rapid intervention appears to be clearly understaffed. The standard target for a rapid intervention division (with appropriate mobility) is 1 officer for 1,000 inhabitants. Combating crime, if the uniformed police do obtain competences on petty crimes and following the introduction of the centralised information system, is close to European standards. The same can be said for the management process.

### The social composition of the forces

Social composition of the forces		percentages of authorised officers				2.31 PROCESS HUMAN RESOURCES	
		females	Bosnians	Serbs	Croats	others	
<b>Figures from 2003</b>							
<b>Federation</b>							
<i>Sarajevo</i>	<b>1.1</b>						
<i>Tuzla</i>	<b>1.2</b>	4.67	82.00	7.60	7.20	3.60	
<i>Zenica</i>	<b>1.3</b>	5.25	71.20	6.10	18.30	4.40	
<i>Mostar</i>	<b>2.1</b>	3.70	42.70	8.50	48.40	0.37	
<i>Bihać</i>	<b>2.2</b>	4.90	85.80	10.70	3.30	0.20	
<i>Travnik</i>	<b>2.3</b>	3.01	51.10	6.50	42.10	0.30	
<i>Livno</i>	<b>3.1</b>	5.40	5.90	15.70	78.40	0.00	
<i>Ljubuški</i>	<b>3.2</b>	2.00	0.80	0.00	99.20	0.00	
<i>Goražde</i>	<b>3.3</b>	9.50	81.20	18.80	0.00	0.00	
<i>Orašje</i>	<b>3.4</b>	10.50	14.40	11.00	74.60	0.00	
<b>Federation police</b>							
<b>total Federation</b>		5.44	48.34	9.43	41.28	0.99	
<b>Republika Srpska</b>		2.70	5.02	94.11	0.66	0	
<b>Brčko District</b>		2.95	40.0	14.7	44.6	0.7	

The most multiethnic police forces are Brčko District and Mostar. Other forces show a more or less strong homogeneity. The most mono-ethnic force is Ljubuški, followed by the Republika Srpska. With regards to the percentage of female officers, Orašje is the leading force with about 10% of female officers, followed by Goražde. Most forces need to improve the inclusion of female officers. As mentioned above, female officers form 8.3% of the total police force.

### 2.3.2 Selection and Training

#### Best practice


- Common selection criteria and selection procedure based on job profiles
- National police training system connected with the general professional training system and delivering generally recognised certificates and degrees (Bologna system; BA and MA)
- 10-12 months basic training, consisting of problem based learning and product-oriented training
- Systematic retraining (for instance, in Hungary, 5 days of retraining for each officer per year)
- Training for specialists
- Training for managers at all levels

#### SWOT

##### Strengths

- Two well performing police academies (Sarajevo and Banja Luka) providing the basic training (first entry level) with modern programmes and methods, and good infrastructure and capacities (for the Federation, the capacity is 600 students, including 300 with onsite accommodation facilities)
- However, the police academies (especially in the Federation) do not have an appropriate human resource policy: teachers are not authorised, they receive a significantly lower salary than regular police officers, and the direction of the police academy is not responsible for hiring teachers: this influences the quality and motivation of the teachers in a negative way
- A modern police High School in Banja Luka, which offers a 2.5 years training programme for crime inspectors
- The faculty of criminology in Sarajevo (university-level programme, with 2 types of programmes proposed: 2 and 4 years). Graduates of the Faculty, if they apply and are selected for the police, receive a transition course of 3 months at the police academy to acquire basic police skills
- Many training activities deployed by the international community
- In the Federation, a ‘police training conference’ that regroups all Heads of training departments in the Cantons

Personnel: Selection and Training



coordinates the training at the Federation level.

### **Weaknesses**

- A fragmented training offer. Each Entity runs its own schools; Cantons in the Federation run their own local training department for retraining purposes; the Canton of Sarajevo hosts a Faculty of criminology. There is no general training architecture at BiH level.
- No global and clear vision of the training needs.
- No police training system connected with the general education system
- Still a large portion of police officers with deficient training. According to a recent survey run by the police academy in Vraca (results not disclosed yet), only a small portion of the force in the Federation (about 10%) attended the police academy; approximately 50% of the forces in the Federation received less than a month in total training (no data available for the RS).
- No basic training school or programme for crime inspectors working at the police station level in the Federation (only a university-level programme for ‘junior inspectors’); loophole in the training system in the Federation!
- No systematised management training
- No systematic retraining policy

### 2.3.3 Salaries and Other Payments

#### Best practice

- Harmonised **base pay** structure
- Staff paid according to pay scale reflecting nature of the job and clear job description
- Staff salaries, taxes and contributions, pension and health insurance paid regularly
- Staff know to which allowances they are entitled
- Staff regularly evaluated
- Salary records regularly updated


#### SWOT

##### Strengths

- In the year 2003, salaries taxes and contributions, pension and health insurance paid regularly



##### Weaknesses


- Salaries linked to the coefficients
- Job descriptions too general
- Staff claims related to the salary payment, pension and health insurance
- No clearly defined and transparent allowance system
- No regularly staff evaluations



This element is an emotive issue and the findings show the existing disparity between the 14 Law Enforcement Agencies visited, which appear on the following charts as at the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2003.







In the period 1999 up to and including the present time, LEA's have used various methods in order to increase the total salaries of their police officers by introducing different types of allowances.

While this has assisted several LEAs in retaining existing well qualified officers, in other LEA's it has had the opposite effect.

The root cause of this perennial problem is the lack of a harmonised base salary throughout BiH linked to a transparent and justifiable living and dangerous duty zone allowance between the geographical areas of operations.


At the same time, the base salaries should be supplemented by a transparent living and where appropriate, a dangerous duty zone allowance, the basis of which should take into account several factors, most notably, the costs of living between the urban and rural areas where police operations are active.

Such a system will have a twofold effect; firstly it will allow the current migration of police officers towards the highest paying LEAs to be minimised, even possibly eliminated, as there will be no financial incentive to transfer to a LEA with a similar base salary structure. Secondly, it will allow the Police Commissioners/Directors of Police to have a higher level of confidence in planning both their activity and budget plans, safe in the knowledge that there will be a minimum of disruption to police staffing.

The existing practice by the Law Enforcement Agencies of using coefficients is considered to be inequitable and is one of the root causes for the existing disparities of police pay throughout BiH. The abolishment of the use of coefficients is recommended at the earliest opportunity and should be replaced with a transparent and justifiable living allowance and dangerous duty zone payment.

It is therefore recommended that a harmonised base pay structure be considered by the forthcoming Police Commission along with a European style grading structure and transparent living and dangerous duty zone allowance.

The recent submission of the draft law on national base salary structures for civil servants including the police was recognised as a first step on the road to addressing this issue. However, it did not focus particularly well on the essential needs of the police service and in our opinion, requires a revision.



### 2.3.4 Management Development

#### Best practice

- Strategic planning of management development
- Systematic assessment of performance and future potential of police managers at all levels
- Management training, with intensive modules for first level managers (Key function)
- Job rotation to increase scope of experience
- Common ranking system to increase transparency and mobility
- Transparent selection procedures
- A salary system linked to ranks


#### SWOT

##### Strengths

Many training activities by the international community

##### Weaknesses

- No strategic planning
- No systematic assessment of performance or potential
- Only limited management training; nearly nothing for first level managers
- No systematic job rotation
- No transparent selection procedures



## 2.4 Finance

### 2.4.1 Budgeting

#### Best practice

- Budgeting is product/process oriented
- Resource allocation decisions are clearly linked to outputs/activities and targets
- Budgeting is a consultative process where trade-offs between conflicting goals are negotiated
- Budgeting is used as a strategic tool for mid- and long term planning
- The principles of effectiveness, efficiency and financial balance are observed

Budgeting in modern administrations shifts from traditional input-oriented thinking to the categories of costs/revenues/outputs. Budgeting is both a strategic tool, expressing strategies and activities into numbers and a motivational tool by linking resources to goals to be achieved. Budget execution is flexible by giving more competences to the level where the output is produced.


#### SWOT

##### Strengths

- Standardised budgeting system.
- Introduction of the new Treasury system.
- Developed budget policy planning cycle in Brčko District
- Commencement at Federation and RS levels of a budget policy planning cycle.

##### Weaknesses

- Ownership of the budget planning cycle limited to the higher echelons within the organisation.
- Lack of coordination between the police activity planning and the police budget planning: budget is



not product/process/output oriented

- Weak justifications for proposed increases in the annual budgets.
- Recruitment, retention and training of suitably qualified accounting personnel constrained by low standards of remuneration.

### **The current situation**

#### **Budget planning periods**

- With the exception of the Brčko District, budgets are generally prepared for the duration of one year. The Brčko District is by European standards the most advanced LEA in terms of forward planning with a 5 year projection plan. However, its development is still at an early stage and by its own assessment still has a long way to progress.
- The MoF of the Sarajevo Canton does its planning based on a five-year period, but Canton Sarajevo MoI is not informed of these plans and can therefore not use them for its own budget planning.


#### **Linkage to activity plans and MoF instructions**

- All MoIs do their activity planning based on a one-year period. There is no systematic strategic budgeting which would take into account longer term goals and would thus require longer term financial planning.
- The Police annual operations/activity plans mostly consist of a general enumeration of activities falling under the responsibilities of the Ministries. These activities are however not detailed in terms of required human and material resources. This in turn prevents costing of the activities, there is thus no reliable basis for expenditure planning. There is also a lack of coherent documentation which would enable decision makers to establish a trail of how costs developed and enable them to draw important lessons and take corrective actions. This situation ultimately leads to budgets being prepared using the previous year's budget with the inclusion of new line items and/or the increase of existing line items by use of percentage increases.
- The budget planning process involves complying with directives from the MoFs, which are of a general nature, such as
  - particular deadlines within which MoIs should submit/review the plan of needed budgetary resources



- general restrictions with regard to proposed amounts of individual budget items (for instance gross salaries should remain at the previous-year's level, material expenditures should not be increased by x % etc.)
- very basic instructions on the formulation of analytical budgeting techniques and constraints which were not promulgated to the end users explaining the rationale behind such limitations.
- Hence, MoIs estimate the required budgetary resources for a one-year period,
  - based on the instructions received from MoFs,
  - with very limited input from operational managers,
  - failing to rely or only slightly relying on the activity plans,
  - with no prior expert analysis of expenditures made.
- This situation ultimately leads to budgets being prepared using the previous year's budget with the inclusion of new line items and/or the increase of existing line items by use of percentage increases. The result of budgeting by using such criteria only produces a weak budget with minimal financial justifications when being reviewed by the MoF.
- The practice of preparing devolved budgets, clearly identifying current Police/SBS processes/activities which are ultimately collated into the total MOI budget are not evident, with the exception of the RS, where efforts have been made by the EUPM Finance Advisor in preparing the FY 2004 budget on this principle.

*Chart: The current budgeting process*



### **Technology**

- Starting in the financial year 2001 a new Treasury Oracle system has been introduced throughout the country at the MoFs. While this will allow the MoFs to control their expenditures within their approved budgets, there is still a need to develop the budgeting module within this system.

### **Training**

- Budget Policy Planning Unit training within the MoFs at both the FBiH and RS levels have been initiated with international assistance. With full commitment from senior management this should allow more accurate budget forecasting as from 2005 onwards.
- Similarly, EUPM Finance Advisors, at RS, FBiH and State levels are now actively assisting their local counterparts in modern European budgeting techniques.

### **Budget approval**

- While BiH legislation (at State / Entity / Canton / Brčko District level) clearly defines that annual budgets should be adopted / approved until 31 December of the current year, the deadline for adoption / approval of the budget is hardly ever respected. At its worst, during 2003 the budgets were not formally adopted / approved until six months after the deadline prescribed by the law
- Delays in adoption / approval of the budget constitute an obstacle for the financial operations of the MoFs, which in turn affect the scale and quality of the tasks performed by the LEAs.

### **Relations of submitted, approved and executed budgets**

While efforts were made to obtain financial data for the last three years it was not possible to capture this data and therefore data for the FY 2003 was used for analysis.

*Table: Submitted, approved and executed budgets of the 14 LEAs as of 31 December 2003 (all amounts in KM)*

LEA	Budget submitted	Budget approved	% of submitted	Budget executed	% of submitted	% of approved
Bihac	25,247,310	22,689,070	90	21,977,458	87	97
Orasje	5,473,080	4,476,850	82	4,559,018	83	102
Tuzla	31,298,297	27,044,100	86	26,476,173	85	98
Zenica	25,297,000	23,101,000	91	21,888,825	87	95
Gorazde	4,048,344	3,355,800	83	3,155,102	78	94
Travnik	17,472,000	17,360,000	99	16,493,124	94	95
Mostar	36,394,351	21,862,200	60	21,334,905	59	98
Ljubuski	10,931,500	8,760,200	80	8,400,165	77	96
Sarajevo	39,149,612	37,693,520	96	37,463,464	96	99
Livno	13,204,946	8,501,500	64	6,698,048	51	79
FBiH	40,231,461	28,158,723	70	26,356,582	66	94
RS	94,293,896	94,293,896	100	92,408,018	98	98
Brcko	8,694,887	8,491,737	98	8,287,502	95	98
SBS	61,762,150	48,000,803	78	47,722,668	77	99
<b>Total</b>	<b>413,498,834</b>	<b>353,789,399</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>343,221,052</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>97</b>

**Main observations:**

- The total of all budgets submitted by 14 LEAs for approval amounted to 413 million KM, the total approved budgets amounted to 354 million KM, i.e. 14% lower.
  - Only RS MoI had the submitted budget approved to the full amount
  - All other LEAs' budget submissions were cut by various percentages, starting from the minimum of 1 % (Travnik), up to a maximum of 40 % (Mostar).
- Budget execution was 343 million KM, i.e. 17% lower than submitted, and effectively 3% lower than the approved budgets.
  - None of 14 LEAs executed the budget to 100 % of the approved amount.
  - Orašje recorded a budget deficit of 2 %
  - All other LEAs spent less than approved, ranging from 1% less (SBS) to 21% less (Livno)

The partly significant variances between submitted and approved budgets was not fully explained but appear to be an indicator of weaknesses in proper budget planning and insufficient justification for the proposed expenditures. The fact that the already reduced approved budgets were not fully executed is primarily also attributable to planning weaknesses with regard to realistic estimation of revenues.

**Budget structure**

Budgetary planning, bookkeeping and financial reporting is done according to the following major items:

- Salaries (net and gross) and allowances for the employees
- Expense allowances for employees and parliament members
- Material and services expenditures
- Travel costs
- Energy costs and utilities expenditures
- Operating supplies

- Transportation and fuel costs
- Maintenance expenditures
- Insurance and banking expenditures, trade operation services and exchange rate losses
- Contracted services

Due to the lack of quality of the data available, analysis of all expenditures according to the actual budget structure is futile and must be limited to certain overall expenditures as of 31 December 2003.

- At the level of all 14 LEAs, gross salaries make up 64% of the total executed budget (percentages vary significantly for individual LEAs, ranging from 51% at RS MoI to 82% at Mostar MoI). The percentages of all other expenditures make up the remaining 36%.
- Along with salaries for their employees, all MoIs pay various types of allowances (daily meals, separation allowance, field work benefits, transportation costs, vacations, sick leave, participation in the work of expert commissions, contracted services etc.)
- The overall amount of allowances contains also payments to non MoI employees. A part of the allowances is paid to external contractors, but for the sake of this analysis we shall observe the total paid salaries and allowances in relation to the total executed budget. Then the budget structure is as follows:
  - gross salaries and allowances 78.68%, all other costs making up only 21.32%
  - the percentage significantly varies from one MoI to another (other costs: RS MoI 36.40%, Mostar MoI 6.19%).
- All allowances are planned at the aggregate level and it is not possible to make a comparison of actual expenditures by types of allowances with regard to the planned ones.
- Legal foundations of the rules on additional remuneration for extra work performed by Cantonal MoI employees are not always well established.

*Table: Salaries and allowances as part of the executed budget (all amounts in KM)*

<b>L EA:</b>	<b>Budget executed</b>	<b>Gross salaries</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Allowances</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Gross salaries &amp; allowances</b>	<b>%</b>
Bihac	21,977,458	15,867,960	72.20	2,624,167	11.94	18,492,127	84.14
Orasje	4,559,018	2,887,404	63.33	620,229	13.60	3,507,633	76.94
Tuzla	26,476,173	18,019,471	68.06	1,998,331	7.55	20,017,802	75.61
Zenica	21,888,825	13,587,345	62.07	2,925,600	13.37	16,512,944	75.44
Gorazde	3,155,102	2,308,620	73.17	333,273	10.56	2,641,893	83.73
Travnik	16,493,124	11,974,726	72.60	2,501,315	15.17	14,476,041	87.77
Mostar	21,334,905	17,424,346	81.67	2,589,630	12.14	20,013,976	93.81
Ljubuski	8,400,165	5,449,665	64.88	1,406,132	16.74	6,855,797	81.62
Sarajevo	37,463,464	26,257,059	70.09	7,632,671	20.37	33,889,730	90.46
Livno	6,698,048	4,491,552	67.06	1,457,407	21.76	5,948,959	88.82
FBiH	26,356,582	16,058,506	60.93	5,094,146	19.33	21,152,652	80.26
RS	92,408,018	47,459,376	51.36	11,312,998	12.24	58,772,374	63.60
Breko	8,287,502	6,116,269	73.80	32,870	0.40	6,149,139	74.20
SBS	47,722,668	32,796,708	68.72	8,823,492	18.49	41,620,201	87.21
<b>Total</b>	<b>343,221,052</b>	<b>220,699,007</b>	<b>64.30</b>	<b>49,352,261</b>	<b>14.38</b>	<b>270,051,268</b>	<b>78.68</b>



## Revenues

Sources of income for the LEAs are:

- Funds from the State, Entity, Canton, Brčko District budget.
- Donations. No details can be provided on possibly received donations as part of the available resources, since most MoIs do not include this kind of information into their financial reports

LEAs perform also various types of services both to other LEAs and governmental institutions (e.g. vehicle maintenance, dog support unit) and to commercial customers (such as armed escorts for money transports, crowd control at pop concerts, etc.). There is a need to ensure that such services are subject to fee rates, which reflect the true costs of the resources being used, whether manpower, equipment or overheads. The lack of proper accounting records for both inter-LEA services and commercial customers is considered a serious weakness. In addition to legal regulations, a professional approach and introduction of European standards of cost accounting are required.

On the question of usage of income generated via such activities as mandatory fines and commercial services the current legislation dictates that all such income is routed back into the single Treasury account of the respective MoF. This income is then commingled with all other income and remains part of the respective MoF Treasury account. Even commercial income generating services provided by the LEA only serve to increase the balance of the single Treasury account.

## 2.4.2 Controlling

### Best practice

- Systematic, information supported and goal oriented steering of operations
- Standardised financial monitoring tools allowing regular comparison between actual/planned status
- Information is processed by compatible information systems
- Developed financial- and cost-accounting systems
- Known indicators against which output and results are measured
- Managers and personnel are aware of the benefits of controlling, understand and use controlling tools
- Well developed horizontal communication


### SWOT

#### Strengths

- Introduction of the new Treasury system.
- Standardised computer generated financial reports.
- Permanent budget monitoring, allowing management to be proactive rather than reactive.
- Procurement regulated by current legislation.

#### Weaknesses

- Absence and/or lack of control on recording and monitoring income.



- Lack of management decisions made based on available computer generated financial reports
- Inability to monitor costs at the process/activity levels.
- Lack of suitably qualified accounting personnel.
- Circumventing controls promulgated by the MoF.
- Non-existence of European cost-accounting methodology.
- Decentralised procurement and poor negotiation of terms and conditions leading to high unit values per item.

### **The current situation**

#### **General problems**

- Weaknesses identified in the budgeting process have a direct bearing on the adequacy of a controlling system. The present system can at best be described as exercising a certain extent of control over actual and planned budget figures at the level of broad cost categories but is substantially lacking the linkage to outputs and strategic targets. There is very little knowledge of the notion of controlling as a system integrating financial and strategic goal monitoring.
- There is a lack of basic controlling tools, e.g. cost-accounting systems which would allow monitoring costs at the level of cost centres (i.e. products, processes). Without such systems no linkage can be established between the input of resources and the output achieved.
- MoIs lack clearly defined targets from which performance indicators could be elaborated. Without goals and performance indicators little can be said about the effectiveness of the products/processes produced and the efficiency of resource consumption.
- Despite the fact that MoIs award large orders to individual suppliers, there is no substantial evidence that normal procurement procedures are established which would allow to obtain the best possible supply terms and conditions. It is a widespread practice to enter into contracts with suppliers based on unit prices failing to take into consideration usual rebates the MoIs could have won given the large quantities of the goods ordered. This additionally aggravates the inefficiencies inherent in decentralised procurement for 14 LEAs.

**Treasury: legal framework**

- Treasury operations were introduced and legally regulated in BiH in 2000 (Law on Treasury, Law on Budget, Law on Budgetary System), and Treasuries have been established as organisational ‘sectors’ of the MoFs.
- The main aims of the introduction of Treasuries are, as defined by the Law, are:
  - transparency of the public accounts
  - improvement of public expenditure management in order to achieve fiscal discipline and control
  - compliance with the priorities, based on expenditures and benefits
  - efficient provision of public services
- The main responsibilities of the Treasury are:
  - Managing and controlling overall cash inflows and outflows in order to ensure efficient management of cash resources in accordance with the approved budget.
  - Setting and executing accounting procedures, as well as the contents and means of financial reporting, in accordance with internationally adopted standards for public sector accounting
  - Implementing budget classification in accordance with international standards
  - Following execution of the budget and report as prescribed by the law
  - Preparing monthly and other reports (quarterly, six-monthly and annual) on the budget execution
  - Conducting efficient control over the execution of the approved budget for all budget beneficiaries. The Treasury ensures that the prescribed amounts are not exceeded.
  - Preparing and implementing effective financial plans on the basis of which the revenues and expenditure are being planned.

**Treasury: technology**

- Starting in the financial year 2001 a new Treasury Oracle system has been introduced throughout the country at the MoFs. This will allow the MoFs to control their expenditures within their approved budgets.

- 9 out of the 14 LEAs studied have on-line connections to the Treasury Oracle system and therefore, in theory, it is possible to have a snapshot picture of the financial situation of committed and spent funds from the approved budget, including a full audit-trail. The remaining 5 LEAs are dependant on the cooperation between themselves and their respective MoF in this regard.
- While there are as many as 50 standardised reports from the new Treasury system, the reporting information generated from the system is only as good as the data inputted into the system. There is no evidence that these reports are analysed, fed to managers and that corrective actions are being taken when deviations from the budget/targets occur.
- The introduction of the new Treasury system software makes it possible to achieve progress towards exercising a high level of control over expenditures against the approved budget. While this is considered a major milestone, it is only the beginning of a long process to undertake financial management reform in the MoFs in general and the MoIs/SBS in particular.
- No matter how many sophisticated computerised systems and software are introduced for use by the MoI/SBS, they are only as strong as their weakest link. This caveat also applies to the operational personnel who operate the computerised systems.

#### **Treasury: training**

- Simultaneously with the introduction of the new Treasury Oracle system, training of staff of MoF and budget beneficiaries, including MoI, has been initiated with international assistance.
- Some staff have gone through the training process several times. It is nevertheless necessary to continue training procedures due to the ever-present personnel fluctuation within the MoIs. This is needed both for newly recruited personnel as well as the individuals who have gone through a training procedure but still have an urge to embark on further education. EC has already programmed funding for further training on Oracle and basic IT skills.

There is an essential need to ensure that trained key operational staff are remunerated at a level commensurate with their responsibilities and a programme developed to ensure Continuing Professional Development (CPD), in order to retain and advance their career progress within the Ministries of Interior/SBS.

#### **External audits**

- The official Entity-level audit institutions of BiH have conducted extensive audits of the LEAs under review.
- However, certain weaknesses with regard to the audits have been identified:

- Audits have so far been only financial and compliance audits. There are no operational/management audits being conducted which would detect deficiencies but could also recommend corrective actions. The present type of audits have sometimes been perceived as counterproductive and alienated the MoIs.
- Audit reports very seldom contained a follow up on recommendations promulgated in previous audit reports.



### 2.4.3 Sustainability

The sustainability question addresses the issue of the type of security affordable for BiH. In other words, it puts the security products (and costs) in relation to the financial capacity of the State. This chapter first addresses the issue of sustainability for BiH in macro terms and, second, looks at the special issue of the sustainability of the police forces in the Cantons.

#### **The macro level analysis**

If we compare the cost of security in BiH in absolute terms with the corresponding cost in the neighbouring countries, security in BiH appears not to be very expensive. Per capita, it costs 52 EUR, as compared to 83 EUR in Hungary and 162 EUR in Slovenia. However, if we look at the financial capacity of the State, the situation is less optimistic. Indeed, the BiH public security budget puts a heavy burden on the public expenditures. All levels of governments aggregated the police budget accounts for 9.2% of the public expenditures. In Hungary, police accounts for 4% of the public expenditures, and in Slovenia it accounts for 3.1% of the public expenditures. Indeed, the revenues of the State per capita are much higher in these two latter countries. While BiH governments have revenue of 575 EUR per capita, the corresponding revenue in Hungary is 1,988 EUR (about 4 times higher) and in Slovenia 5,246 EUR (about 10 times higher). If we look at the indicator of the percentage share of the police budget to the GDP, we find a similar pattern: it is 2.9% in BiH while in EU countries it is 1.0% and in transition CEE countries it is 2.0%.

In general, the public expenditure level in BiH is considered to be maintained at a non sustainable level for a country with a weak economy. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, April 2004) estimates the public expenditure level to be as high as 47% of the GDP, while the corresponding figures for the region are 40%. It should be noted that in the benchmarking countries, Hungary still has a similar figure like BiH with 49% (2002) coming down from 64% in 1994.

With 9.2% of all public expenditures, the police of BiH significantly contribute to this 'fat' State and high-spending situation. With such a large share of the public expenditure, cuts in spending in the police budget would have a substantial impact on the State finances and would create a better balance between the State and the private sector.

A larger than 'normal' share of public expenditures for policing could be legitimate under the circumstances of severe security problems. But as it has been demonstrated in the problem analysis in the product and processes chapters, this is not the case in BiH. While BiH faces challenges in a number of issues, public security is relatively high. In fact, the organisational analysis of the police shows that there are many areas of 'over-policing' (overstaffed processes, overstaffed rural areas, underused productivity areas, etc.). The potential for rationalisation and increase of productivity are there and, provided the right measures of reorganisation and restructuring are undertaken, the same level of product can be maintained at lesser cost. Also, manoeuvring room in policing for the privatisation of some services should be considered in the future and would contribute to stimulate the local economy.



<b>Financial figures</b>							
		<b>State budget</b>	<b>police budget</b>	<b>Police share</b>	<b>Police Cost</b>	<b>Police as</b>	<b>State</b>
		<b>(in KM)</b>	<b>(in KM)</b>	<b>of</b>	<b>per capita</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>	<b>budget per</b>
				<b>State budget</b>	<b>2003</b>		<b>capita</b>
					<i>in KM</i>		<i>(in KM)</i>
<b>Cantonal level</b>							
<b>Sarajevo</b>	<b>1.1</b>	459,228,300	37,693,520	8	94		<b>1,144</b>
<b>Tuzla</b>	<b>1.2</b>	204,341,700	27,352,500	13	54		<b>400</b>
<b>Zenica</b>	<b>1.3</b>	156,809,000	23,101,000	15	58		<b>393</b>
<b>Mostar</b>	<b>2.1</b>	113,300,000	21,862,200	19	100		<b>520</b>
<b>Bihać</b>	<b>2.2</b>	117,336,141	22,689,070	19	74		<b>381</b>
<b>Travnik</b>	<b>2.3</b>	87,050,449	17,360,000	20	72		<b>361</b>
<b>Livno</b>	<b>3.1</b>	37,560,000	8,501,500	23	102		<b>449</b>
<b>Ljubuški</b>	<b>3.2</b>	48,500,000	8,760,200	18	108		<b>596</b>
<b>Goražde</b>	<b>3.3</b>	16,772,660	3,355,800	20	95		<b>476</b>
<b>Orašje</b>	<b>3.4</b>	22,997,701	4,476,850	19	103		<b>528</b>
<b>Federation level</b>		1,217,400,000	28,158,723	2	12		<b>525</b>
<b>total Federation</b>		2,481,295,951	203,311,363	8	88		<b>1,069</b>
<b>Republika Srpska</b>		1,020,307,870	94,293,896	9	86		<b>928</b>
<b>Brčko District</b>		224,993,000	8,491,737	4	89		<b>2,362</b>
<b>State level (SBS)</b>		201,939,642	48,000,803	24	14		
<b>total police in BiH</b>		3,927,936,463	354,097,799	9.2	104	2.9	1,148
		in EUR	1,963,968,232	9.2	51.8		574

Benchmarking	State budget		Police as % of State budget		Police Cost per capita		Police as % of GDP		State budget per capita	
	in EUR	in EUR	2003	2003	2003	2003	from 2000	2000	capita	capita
Hungary	20,425,300,000.00	848,300,000.00	4	82.6	1.7	1,988				
Slovenia	10,302,800,000.00	318,900,000.00	3	162.4	1.6	5,246				
Canton of Vaud (CH)		160,887,331.00		256.0						
Canton of Fribourg (CH)		43,667,553.13		180.0						
Land of Rheinland-Pfalz (D)	6,743,000,000.00	491,000,000.00	7	121.0	2.0	1,662				
Average transition CEE										
Average EU										

Sources: Ministries of finances statistics for BiH, police forces for Vaud, Fribourg, Rheinland-Pfalz; IMF for CEE and average EU

### The Cantonal level

In the Federation, public security expenditures account for a very large share of the Cantonal expenditures (see table). On average, the share of the public expenditures consumed by the police is about 20% in the Federation. A high percentage is found mainly in the smaller, rural, and (economically) weak Cantons. In Livno, policing accounts for 23% of the Cantonal budget. The problem is much less acute in the larger and economically stronger Cantons such as Sarajevo, Tuzla or Zenica. In these Cantons, the police budget is taking a smaller share of the Cantonal budget, between 8% (Sarajevo) and 15% (Zenica).

A comparison needs to be made cautiously since the public policies portfolio of a Canton is quite different from that of a German Land. Nevertheless, the share of police budget – 7% - in the budget of the Land for the benchmarking German Land of Rheinland-Pfalz is much lower than a BiH Canton. On average, the share to the total public expenditure of the Länder is around 40% in Germany. In BiH, the share of the Cantons is around 50%.

Given the fact that Cantons are invested with a large number of costly tasks (some of them jointly with the Federal government) such as health, education, social welfare apart from public security, serious doubt arise on the capacity of the Cantonal government to efficiently carry out all of them (this needs to be assessed globally by the Public Administration Reform).

- *On the one hand*, the question of appropriateness of the current burden-sharing between the Federation level and the Cantonal level is relevant. The policing budget on the Federation level of government only represents 2% of their total public expenditures. The general distribution of the State income between the Federation level of government and the Cantonal level is about 50% each.

- *On the other hand*, the current constitution of the Federation does not seem to provide a clear legal basis for the provision of joint service supply which would allow cutting expenditures and making necessary joint investments. Indeed, art. 3 of chapter V of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina states that collaboration between Cantons is possible, but it does not seem to include a joint service. According to this article, ‘Cantons may establish Council of Cantons in order to coordinate policies and activities on matters of common interest to their communities (...). These may include coordinating bodies, such as commissions and working groups, to share information and harmonise the Cantons’ respective actions in implementing their responsibilities, but may not include military or political arrangements.’

The future system should revisit the current allocation of policies and resources between the levels of governments. At the same time, the Cantons with the higher public security costs and the less sustainable polices are also the Cantons which maintain disproportionate large forces in areas with little security problems. Criminality is an urban problem, not a rural problem. It is not rational that a rural Canton such as Goražde maintains a force that is, in relative terms, almost 2 times larger than the urban and capital city Canton of Sarajevo. The cost of the police in a rural Canton such as Ljubuški is today 2 times higher than what it is in Tuzla or Zenica. The small and rural Cantons will face the main challenge of reducing their force in the next years to lower the burden of the police on the public expenditures. Finally, it will also be necessary for small police forces such as the Cantonal ones to collaborate to provide joint services and, if the current constitution does not allow it, constitutional changes might be needed.

## 2.5 The SBS – Specific Assessment

The State Border Service (SBS) is quite different from the other studied LEAs, and the assessment of the present situation in certain areas (products, support processes / organisation, human resources) is presented in this separate chapter rather than together with the findings for the other LEAs in order to ensure better legibility of this report. Other topics (those related to finance, i.e. budgeting, controlling, sustainability) lend themselves more easily to an integrated approach due to fewer specificities and higher similarity in findings. These are not addressed separately in this chapter but are integrated in the general chapter on finance. The chapters on the vision and the road to the future cover all LEAs studied including SBS.

### Context

The General Framework Agreement for Peace states under Annex 4, Article 3, Additional Responsibilities that: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall assume responsibility for such other matters as are agreed by the Entities; are provided for in Annexes 5 through 8 to the General Framework Agreement; or are necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the division of responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Additional institutions may be established as necessary to carry out such responsibilities.*’ The State Border Service was created after the OHR imposed the Law on State Border Service in early 2000 and became operational in late spring 2001.

### 2.5.1 Products

According to the present law on SBS, ‘The Border Service is responsible for the protection of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Border protection includes the following duties:

1. Surveillance of the borders;
2. Control of cross-border traffic within a zone extending to ten (10) kilometers from the international border of BiH, except in those cases where the distance to the Entity boundary line is less than 10 km, in which case the responsibilities of the Border Service shall extend to half the distance from the international border to the Entity boundary line. This duty includes:
  - a) Inspection of border-crossing documents as well as of authorisation for crossing the border,
  - b) Apprehension or prevention of non-permitted entry into BiH,
  - c) Search for persons within the border zone.’

The area of operation of the SBS is thus in general restricted to the 10 km border zone and the international airports. However, the SBS can operate in the entire territory of BiH if the operation is related to border protection (e.g. finding the perpetrators of border related criminal acts, etc.).

The draft of the new law on SBS – which is expected to be adopted later this year, will provide more details on the exact tasks of the SBS in the border area, and foresees a stronger role of SBS with regard to controlling the residence and movement of aliens in the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Some performance indicators for SBS and benchmarking countries are given below. However care needs to be taken, since the specificities of each country (differences in border guarding policy, type and amount of border traffic, definitions and monitoring of indicators) do not allow for simple comparison and evaluation.

<b>Types of checks (BiH)</b>	<b>No. of checks (01/12/2002-30/11/2003)</b>
Passengers	44,956,000
Vehicles	14,300,000
Trucks	1,336,000
Buses	330,000
Trains	15,000
Planes	8,420
Ships	30


- In 2002, during its first full year of operations, SBS identified 390 illegal immigrants, whereof 114 at the BCPs and 276 in the border zone. In 2003, 957 persons were apprehended while attempting to illegally cross the border or immediately after having illegally crossed the State border. Out of these 957, 486 persons attempted to enter BiH, (315 outside a BCP and 171 at a BCP), while 471 persons attempted to illegally exit BiH, (189 outside a BCP and 282 at a BCP). All these cases were processed by the SBS, as they occurred in the border zone or at BCPs.
- For comparison, the 2002 Slovenian apprehension figures on the border with Croatia alone amount to 4,828, most of them citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1,422) and Macedonia (798). Partly, these higher apprehension figures can be explained by the fact that illegal migration seems to go north of Bosnia and Herzegovina, directly from Vojvodina via Croatia to Slovenia, and partly because of problems linked to protecting the green borders in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- In 2003, SBS officers refused entry to a total of 9,770 persons, which is a figure comparable to other countries in the region.

### Strengths

- The tasks of the border guards at the Border Crossing Points (BCPs) – i.e. checking the identity of passengers, the validity of documents and vehicle control within their area of responsibility – are considered professionally done, and especially the stricter control at the Airport of Sarajevo has led to a decline of irregular migrant flows.

### Weaknesses

- Surveillance capacity between the BCPs and in the border zone is not yet fully adequate. The deployment to certain areas can take up to several hours. Based upon earlier assessments, there are 432 identified locations where it is possible to cross the BiH State border, of which 89 are legal border crossing points of various categories. Although at this moment most of those locations are under regular patrol of SBS officers, for a certain number of locations the protection is still in the planning phase.
- A complicating factor with regard to the proper surveillance of the State border is the lack of clear demarcation and still existent disputes with neighbouring States on the exact location of the border. Furthermore, as legacy from the former Yugoslavia, there are many persons, especially farmers, who own land on both sides of the border. This continues to cause problems, both for the border guards and the landowners.
- An unsatisfactory situation exists with regard to cancelling visa. In accordance with the current law, SBS is only authorised to refuse entry to a visa bearer in case the visa is forged. In other cases, even if the SBS officer suspects that the visa bearer has a different reason to enter the country than stated in the visa, SBS officers are not authorised to refuse entry to a traveller with a valid visa. They can only start a procedure to cancel the visa at the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As this is rather complicated, not many such procedures are initiated. As result, irregular flows are taking place using these flaws in the present situation, although there are no figures on all suspected cases available.





## 2.5.2 Support Processes / Organisation

### 2.5.2.1. Management Process and Overall Organisation

#### **Best practices**

- The competent public authority is a specialised police/border guard force (not a military force)
- Centralised supervision and instructions for border checks and surveillance under the auspices of a ministry working in the field of justice and home affairs
- All activities are coordinated at central, regional and local levels. Specialised officers/teams/units are established to combat the crime of illegal crossing of the border, at different levels if needed. The organisation should provide highly specialised services required for border checks/surveillance - for example on false documents.
- Operations are based upon a long-term strategic plan, addressing concrete goals for the future, and include measures in countries of origin and transit, as well as activities at the border and inland control.

#### **Strengths**


- Professional, independent police force with an organisational structure comparable to EU countries with similar independent border guard organisations (Germany, Finland): strong central headquarters supported by regional offices with a certain level of independence to take operational decisions.
- The management is committed to developing SBS in direction of Schengen best practices.

#### **Weaknesses**

- Legal situation complicated
  - The present set of laws and rules makes the work of the SBS unnecessarily complicated, as books of rules of Bosnia Herzegovina, the entities, the Cantons as well as Brčko District are different, and influence the work of SBS in the border zone. There are three laws under development which are expected to change the present legal void.



- The various relevant laws which currently determine the reporting lines for the SBS are incongruent. The SBS Director at present has to report to the Minister of Security, the BiH Council of Ministers and the BiH Presidency.
- SBS directors need to be appointed on the basis of an open procedure, and on the basis of proven qualities. Stricter separation of political supervision and operational management is needed. The draft Law on SBS – if adopted – is expected to improve the present situation in this regard.
- Strategic plan not yet finalised. It is expected that the multi-annual plan will be available by the end of 2004.
- Several chapters of the Schengen Catalogue address the issue of closer co-operation and co-ordination with other LEAs, other actors at the borders, such as customs, as well as international co-operation. Although strong initiatives have been taken in this regard – among others an ongoing assessment of the situation in BiH with regard to Integrated Border Management, and the conclusion of MoUs with relevant partner agencies – the co-operation is far from Schengen best practices, which include joint databases, joint risk analysis and joint trainings. There is no clear integrated approach involving all authorities to tackle the problem of illegal migration.



### 2.5.2.2. Information Systems

#### Best practices

- A two-way information exchange exists between central and local levels of the border management authority. The local authorities should be instructed to gather information, analyse it locally, and pass it on to central level. The central level should compile all information country-wide, process it into usable form and deliver it to local authorities to be used as a tool for tactical risk analysis and operational planning.
- A secure database is established to exchange experiences between units and to distribute information on intelligence objects. This database is available for use in border management. Information in the intelligence database is hidden, until a specific inquiry is made. Authorisation to search is controlled by a supervisory unit.

### Strengths

- The development of a better information system is given a high priority by the SBS management, and several initiatives and projects are under way to support the improvement of information gathering, analysis and exchange.
- Operational risk assessment,, inter alia to decide on deployment of mobile units, takes place in field offices.
- The SBS HQ has direct (read-only) access to Interpol, and works closely with the SECI Centre in Bucharest to share information on relevant border related crimes.


### Weaknesses

- Due to lack of infrastructure, most BCPs have no direct access to a centrally managed database, and updates are provided to the BCPs at intervals per CD ROM
- The central risk assessment activities need further improvement. The activities of the mobile units of SBS are based upon an analysis of criminal activities at the borders (e.g. smuggling of people, cattle or goods). However, a clear evaluation and analysis of all relevant data from both sides of the borders (i.e. from BiH and neighbouring State) is lacking.

### 2.5.2.3. Logistics, Infrastructure, Equipment

#### Best Practices

- Permanent analysis determines the allocation of personnel and technical resources
- For the purposes of medium and long-term operative management, to ensure that resources will be allocated optimally along the border and to maintain a reasonable risk level in respect to illegal crossing of the border, estimates should be made of the level of risk defined by the authorities in respect to illegal crossing of the border, the level of detected irregularities and the level of estimated undetected irregularities.
- Facilities should be in place to carry out compulsory entrance and exit checks




- BCPs need to be built in coordination with the neighbouring country to achieve adequacy of means (dimensions, lanes, installations), and in coordination with other services with a role at the border, such as customs
- Document examination instruments, (UV light, white overhead light, transmitted light), magnifying glass, retro-reflective lamps, stamps) available at BCPs.
- Thermographic cameras, binoculars etc. available for border surveillance:

### Strengths

- Basic equipment is available to execute SBS tasks. Most BCPs and mobile units are equipped with essential tools for checking documents
- There are sufficient numbers of cars, motorbikes and other means of transportation
- There are clear terms of reference for the usage of vehicles etc.

### Weaknesses

- Only few BCPs are connected to a central database
- There is a lack of personal weapons (approximately 1,000 pistols), which are scheduled for procurement during 2004.
- Not all BCPs have sanitary facilities, neither for staff nor passengers
- Budget does not foresee investment in upgrading available instruments



## 2.5.3 The Human Resources Dimension

### 2.5.3.1. Overall Staffing

According to the present situation, there are 2,701 planned posts (staff at borders and SBS HQ). Currently, thereof 1,961 are occupied, and thus some 740 are vacant. However, the SBS is drafting the new Rule Book on Internal Organisation and Systematisation of the staff posts. After its finalisation, the number of planned posts will be reduced to 2,453.

The table below shows the current and (in brackets) planned figures for BiH and benchmarking countries, for staff directly involved in controlling border crossings at borders and BCPs (excluding HQ staff) in a ratio to border length and passenger flow. Notably, Slovenia plans to increase the number of staff at the borders and BCPs in order to fulfil Schengen requirements, although they will be controlling a shorter (external EU) border.

Country	Length of borders (km)	Passenger flow, 2003	Staff at borders & BCPs (Planned)	Staff per km border (Planned)	Staff at borders & BCPs per 100,000 passengers, 2003
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,551	44,956,000	1,884 (approx. 2,350)	1.2 (approx.. 1.5)	4.2 (approx.. 5.2)
Slovenia	1,380	180,000,000	2,350 (approx. 3,100)	1.7 (approx.. 2.3)	1.3 (approx.. 1.7)
Hungary	2,171	89,841,302	9,500	4.4	10.5

### Best practice

- Effective border checks and surveillance require that the number of staff must be adapted to risk assessment, based on detailed analysis (in-depth survey of other States systems could serve as example)
- Regular evaluation in which e.g. job satisfaction, effectiveness, social conditions and liability are measured
- Organisation should provide programmes and facilities at central and local level to support officers during their career, by offering education and training on issues relevant for their work

### Strengths

- Have identified all needed positions, and by rationalising brought the total number of staff to a very reasonable number (see table above). Compared to several other countries in the region, the SBS remains a rather small service, even if taking into account that these countries – Slovenia and Hungary for example – might have more intense border traffic and/or longer borders
- The ethnic structure of the SBS is based upon the BiH census of 1991 and each SBS unit has a multiethnic structure. The Law on SBS, stipulates that, with the aim of achieving the multiethnic

structure, SBS units may have not more than two thirds and not less than 10% of personnel from any ethnic group in BiH. In that sense, the ethnic structure of all SBS organisational units is precisely defined and determined.

- SBS management tries to enhance motivation amongst their staff by providing stable, regular and high salaries, rewarding personnel for extraordinary work results and in cases of especially professional behaviour and respect of the ethic code and by conducting disciplinary sanctions for different types of breaking the working code and misbehaviour at work.
- The SBS management has recognised the corruption problem, and its openness is an example for correct handling of this problem. Tough measures, such as redeployment and non-prolongation of contracts, have been applied.

### Weaknesses

- The State Border Service still lacks 492 employees (or 20%) of its projected staff (according to the new operational plan – according to the current plan there is an understaffing of 740 employees).
- No career planning system in place

### 2.5.3.2. Selection and Training

#### Best practices

- Written rules for recruiting new staff, which should meet physical, moral and legal requirements (criminal records checked)
- High level of professionalism, based on successfully completed training
- Training should include: basic rules and procedures, document checks (valid, falsified), rules for entry stay and exit, co-operation and coordination with other agencies, police cooperation, judicial cooperation
- Staff should be encouraged to learn languages necessary/useful for their work
- Specialised officers should train staff at all BCPs
- Specialised management training, including international experience




## Strengths

- Almost all staff (1750 out of 1961, or almost 90%) have received the basic or transitional training. All lower ranking staff that was taken over from the various police forces have been prepared for their new tasks in the training centre in Suhodol, as well as via training ‘on the job’.
- Considering the large number of applicants for jobs at the SBS, the SBS can and does use a very strict selection system to choose only highly qualified staff.

## Weaknesses

- Senior and middle management have not yet all completed the basic or the transitional training. It is planned to ensure the participation of all senior officers in the transition course during 2004, although it remains to be seen whether present budget – and thus staffing - constraints would indeed allow for this.
- No specific management training courses implemented, although plans to do so are in a far advanced stage. Management training should be part of regular curriculum for managers, not limited to bi-lateral initiatives. Latter should be seen as temporary solution
- There is a clear and recognised lack of higher educated staff affecting proper planning and management, and there are plans to fill the open positions with 230 staff members with middle or higher degree and 70 with a university degree. The very stringent selection procedure for the first group has been completed. However, lack of financial resources implies that the selected candidates cannot be employed. The selection of staff with a university degree is ongoing.
- The training centre itself needs either upgrading or new facilities should be developed.






## 2.5.4 Salaries

### Strengths

The average salary at SBS (KM 827) – compared above to the other LEAs - is approximately equal to the average salary of a Hungarian or Slovakian border guard (approx. KM 800) and is among the highest in Bosnia and Herzegovina's law enforcement agencies. Only police officers of Canton Sarajevo (KM 873) and the Brčko District (KM 1259) earn more. Combined with other factors, this clearly contributes to higher motivation of the SBS staff, and makes the SBS an attractive employer.

### Weaknesses

The current salary scheme of SBS is that of a civil service agency, which is unsuitable for a LEA and does not provide the senior management with enough possibilities for differentiation in the salary scales.





## AGENDA

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- Products
- Support Processes / Organisation
- Personnel
- Finance
- SBS

## SWOT Summary

Analysis of the Environment


The Vision: Future Strategies and Structural Consequences


- Products
- Support Processes / Organisation
- Personnel
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The Road to the Future

- Management of Change Strategies
- The Implementation Program

### 3 SWOT SUMMARY





The products delivered by the various police forces in BiH today are respectable, considering the difficult circumstances. This is the result of a combination of highly motivated local professionals and the technical assistance and investment of the international community. However, the SWOT barometer shows that there are major deficiencies on all other dimensions of the scorecard that need to be addressed by the future organisation. This section summarises the main findings of the SWOT analysis.

***On the positive side***

The product side of the police services is in general of good quality. The **subjective level of security** is comparatively good, with limited public order problems, and with an average of 75% of the population feeling secure in the street of their area after dark. On average, 64.8% of the BiH population consider that the police do good work.

The estimated **response time to emergency calls** indicates that the European standards are almost achieved, except for in the rural areas.

The figures shows also that **classic crime** is under control.

**Passenger and vehicle controls** at Border Crossing Points are conducted in a professional manner and have led to a reduction of the number of illegal migrants

### ***On the negative side***

#### **1) Certain products show deficiencies:**

- Rising forms of criminality such as organised crime, corruption, financial crimes, youth criminality and narcotics are not properly addressed by the system
- Green border surveillance is still insufficient.
- Relatively high road accident ratio, taking into account the fact that there are comparatively less cars in BiH than in other European states.

#### **2) Low productivity** (relation between the input – staff, equipment, finance - in the processes and the product) level due to several factors.

- Overstaffing in many police processes (administrative, local policing, etc.) and understaffing in others (rapid intervention, border guarding)
- Outdated technology (mobility is low, control rooms are not equipped properly)
- Central information systems still missing or with few functionalities (The international community identified this as a major deficiency: the EU finances the creation and the corresponding training for various types of databanks; ICTAP addresses this issue with the SPRS)
- Lack of interoperability in communication systems between cantons on the one hand and between the Entities on the other
- Outdated policing approach (uniformed police does not investigate petty or street crimes, few community policing approaches, the mobile traffic force spends a high percentage of its time in traffic controls whereas it should really be a rapid intervention force)

#### **3) The management process** is recognised as a specifically problematic area

- Lack of adequate division of labour between the MoIs and the operational heads of police (Commissioners, Directors of police); most of the administrative personnel in the MoIs work for the police and should therefore be administratively under the police commissioner/director of police (e.g. the training departments)
- No adequate operational and strategic planning
- Culture/policy of command outdated (no management by objectives, too little empowerment of lower ranks)
- Weaknesses in financial management (budgeting, controlling, cost-accounting) hamper operational and strategic planning and reduce cost-effectiveness.

- 4) The productivity is further limited by a **deficient human resources policy**. In all police organisations, the personnel accounts for 70 to 80% of the cost. This figure in itself is self-explanatory in as to why the human resource element is a strategic key to the success of a police. This importance is not yet translated into reality.
- First of all, training in BiH is partially not adequate. There are institutional loopholes in the training system (for instance no crime investigators school for all the inspectors under the rank of junior inspector in the Federation); while the basic training has improved drastically in the recent years, the police academy of the Federation does not control basic functions such as professors' recruitment and the professors receive a low salary. Exercising key functions, managers at all levels from top management to first line management at police stations and border crossing points have yet to be properly trained. In general, the training area needs to be accepted as a priority area and managed centrally.
  - Second, the salary system is not adequate. In general salaries are too low and, in addition, there are wide disparities across the LEAs which impact negatively on human resource planning, put a heavy stress on personnel to get a second job and make them vulnerable to corruption,
  - Third, there is a highly imbalanced age structure in the police forces that can be explained by historical reasons (many police officers were recruited during the war years). The police age pyramid is highly skewed. 78% of the police officers are aged between 27 and 45 years. This imbalance will create management problems in the future (heavy pressure on training and recruitment in 10-15 years from now for instance if nothing is undertaken to smoothen up the current imbalance).
- 5) Today the police in BiH is financially **not sustainable**. With a 9.2% share of all public expenditure, the police/SBS place a significant burden on the public budget. Public expenditures account for 47% of GDP, according to the PRSP of April 2004, while 2.9% of the GDP are currently consumed by the police expenditure. In the two benchmarking transition countries, the police budget accounts for 4% of the public expenditures in Hungary and for 3.1% in Slovenia. Public security must become cheaper in the future. An additional problem appears to be specific to the Federation. Indeed, 86% of the spending in policing in the Federation is currently on the Cantons' shoulders while they have to sustain other expensive public policies. The burden is especially high in small and economically less developed Cantons where police consumes up to 23% of the Cantonal budget. The overall public administration reform must assess in a more general way whether the distribution of resources between levels of governments is correctly adjusted to the distribution of the responsibilities in the Federation and whether solidarity mechanisms between Cantons should not be introduced.
- 6) The **overall organisation** of BiH police forces today is also problematic. Vital central functions for guaranteeing a coherence and sustainability of the system are not performed by the State today. Functions such as selection and training, salary system, standards, procurement of heavy and interoperable equipment are not performed at the State level but addressed (mainly) locally by the Cantons, the Brčko District or the RS. Moreover, most Cantonal or PSC units do not reach the critical mass to organise rationally and economically many police products and processes, such as rapid intervention, special crime investigation units, or support units. From an organisational point of view, the system needs profound restructuring.

- 7) Finally, the level of **adaptation and staffing** of the policing processes **to present security problems** is low (relation between the processes and the context).
- This is particularly evident in the heavy overstaffing of the rural Cantons while urban Cantons are closer to European standards.
  - The challenges of international, inter-regional, and, in general, organised crimes are not adequately addressed by BiH police forces. However, the new SIPA is the right response to this issue; it will need to cooperate fully with the regional crime departments.

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Support processes / Organisation  
Personnel  
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The Road to the Future

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## 4 ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

### Opportunities

- The level of ‘normal’ criminality is considerably lower in BiH than in EU or other transition countries. Even if this level will grow with increasing life-standards, early prevention action should be taken to keep it below the European average.
- A high level of public security is an important asset to attract foreign investors and tourists, but also a key argument for returning refugees.
- There is a high motivation on the local side to reach European police standards. The general openness for reform and change is positive.
- The international community is still prepared to give important support to the reform of the BiH police. This reform should become a pilot case of constructive collaboration between the local and international community, giving more and more importance to the local ownership.

### Threats

- BiH is still a ‘soft target’ country for organised crime and terrorism. If this is not changed, it will have a very negative impact on the political, economical and social future of the country.
- BiH is not yet a completely stable country.
- The international community could lose its interest in BiH if reform acceptance and implementation are not fast enough.
- The money available for police reform coming both from the local and the international side is limited. If it is not used following a clear and stable strategy and respecting the principles of professional accounting and controlling, there will clearly be an important shortage of financial means.
- If the police does not become a more attractive employer, qualified people will walk away and take other jobs

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## 5 THE VISION – FUTURE STRATEGIES AND THEIR STRUCTURAL CONSEQUENCES

### 5.1 The Operation Products and Processes

#### 5.1.1 *Local Policing*

**Local policing is the first policing level, which corresponds administratively to a municipality (or an association of municipalities) and should be organised, led and controlled at regional level**

- The primary mission of the BiH local policing process needs to be adapted.
  - In addition to patrolling the streets and controlling public order, the uniformed police at the police station level should:
    - Obtain judicial powers and investigate petty crimes
    - Control and regulate all local traffic
- Strengthen the management of local policing
  - Increase the partnership at the policy level with municipal and judiciary (mayor, municipal court) authorities, and create Local Security Council and periodic Public Safety Plans
  - Local policing must be managed at the local level: use indicators of performance at municipal level and control them regularly
- Reallocate resources and reorganise
  - Reduce the number of personnel (1 officer for 1,000 inhabitants in urban areas and 1 for 2,000 in rural areas) and partially transfer them to other processes
  - Adapt the number and type of patrols in the streets (shift system) to security needs (focus on hot spots/times)
  - Close sub-stations during the night
- Add new processes and methods
  - Consultation (periodic consultation of the local community to set up the policing agenda)
  - Local Security Diagnostic (periodic photography of objective and subjective security)
  - Partnerships

- Problem-solving skills
  - ‘Soft specialisation’ of some uniformed police officers in investigating petty crimes (an average of 30 to 50% of all crimes)
- The tasks of the regional level
    - To allocate the appropriate resources to the local police stations according to their needs
    - To provide support in new methodology, standards and processes, and organisation to the local police stations
    - To provide controlling measures and analysis to the local police stations
    - To manage coordination mechanisms between municipalities/local police stations such as weekly operational meetings between the local police station chiefs
    - To guarantee a balance in the allocation of the resources between the different processes
    - To establish and maintain the partnerships with regional-level pertinent actors

### 5.1.2 Rapid Intervention

**The rapid intervention is a process that needs to be coordinated at a regional level, requires regional investments, and, depending on the model adopted, the integration in the process of different police organisations**

- Reorganise and change the mission of the traffic units
  - The traffic police can act as the core of this new rapid intervention division, but with a modified mission: respond to all emergencies as core mission and transfer controlling and regulation activities to the local police stations
  - If necessary, increase the number of staff of this division so as to reach a standard of 1 mobile officer for 1,000 inhabitants
- Change the processes and organisation
  - The control rooms are staffed with trained operators who respond to calls and *directly* engage the patrols in the field (one-step process)
  - On a weekly basis, define preventive missions for patrol cars engaged in the rapid intervention process
  - Guarantee and control response time: 5 minutes in urban areas, 20 minutes in rural areas
  - Maintain the heavy accident unit as a specialised team in the rapid intervention division
- Invest in new equipment

- Invest in new regional operation/control rooms (neighbouring smaller regional units, if they subsist in the new organisation, should join forces to reach a threshold of 1 control room for 700,000 inhabitants)
- Increase mobility of this division with adequate vehicles. If the acquisition of a new vehicle park is necessary, consider the leasing option
- Transform traffic police stations into intervention centres well distributed or territorially situated
- Training
  - Adapt the training in the police academies to integrate the necessary knowledge for the rapid intervention
  - Only the unit specialised in heavy accident investigation should receive a specialised training
- Institutional regional cooperation framework (depending on the future organisation model)
  - To invest and operate regional control rooms, Cantons of the Federation – if they subsist - will have to cooperate jointly.
    - The weakest type of cooperation is a ‘convention’. On a voluntary basis, 2 or more Cantons agree to create a joint control room which can be operated either by one police force or jointly. The convention does not create new political institutions and the Cantonal executives, parliaments and control instances remain competent.
    - The strongest type of cooperation would be an ‘association’ where 2 or more Cantons would merge their police services into one regional police service. Such a solution would require constitutional changes.

### 5.1.3 Crime investigation

**Crime investigation needs to be reorganised in-depth. The current five levels of vertical organisation must be simplified, whilst more cooperation between the different units needs to be stimulated.**

- In the future, the uniformed police should perform crime investigation at the police station level. A comparable organisation in the Brčko District police force is evaluated very positively by the police management and corresponds to the trend in Western Europe. Combating petty crime is time consuming, requires only basic investigation skills – that can be acquired during the basic police academy training – and is a motivation factor for the uniformed police. In BiH, about 50% of the crime investigated by a direction (*uprava*) is investigated at the police station level. A certain degree of specialisation within the uniformed police – called ‘soft specialisation’ – can be considered for specific crimes.
- Combating serious crime should be organised at the regional level. Serious crimes need to be investigated by crime inspectors with a corresponding specialised training, either in the Junior college in the RS or the Faculty of Criminology in the Federation.
- All specialised support services, such as arrest teams, observation teams, Special Forces (hostage, terror), forensic experts and crime analysis should be organised at the regional level.

- Complex crimes should be investigated by the new SIPA.
- The SIPA should also function as a coordinating agency for crimes that go beyond the boundaries of regions/entities
- In addition, the SIPA should provide crime analysis and conceptual definition of crimes for the regional crime departments
- The SIPA should lead a working group composed of all Heads of regional crime departments to guarantee a coherent approach
- The most complicated expertise, such as DNA analysis, should be provided by centres of competences operated and financed by the State.
- For the efficiency of all crime departments, a common information system regulated by the national data protection law is of crucial importance.

#### 5.1.4 Crowd Control

**As the control rooms, the support units should be operated at regional level, but standards' definition and coordination should be a State task**

- Since the support units are not economical at Cantonal or PSC level (low use, but costly), regional solutions should be preferred. The local support units should be merged and (in rural areas) downsized accordingly.
- The future organisational model selected will have consequences on the measures to be taken: as for the control rooms, these regional units should be financed jointly on the basis of a ratio of annual use. The largest unit of the region should be responsible for the operation, training and maintenance of the support unit
- In a similar convention, the Brčko District support unit should be integrated in a regional support force (Tuzla as a possibility).
- In the RS, the 9 existing support units should be regrouped in 3 regional units and also downsized accordingly
- In addition, on State level, the Ministry of Security should at least have the responsibility of defining the standards (doctrine, training, equipment) and of coordinating the 'regional' support units for exceptional events.
- A fraction of the uniformed officers of the local police station/rapid intervention processes should be equipped with basic protective equipment and trained once per annum in basic crowd control tactics.



### 5.1.5 *Border Guarding*

#### **SBS needs additional competencies for entry refusal and inland controls, an integrated border management strategy, full staffing and a less complicated legal framework.**

- SBS should get authority to refuse entry to aliens with a valid visa when they have clear indications that the reason for entering BiH are different to that indicated in the visa. Officers should receive special training to ensure no wrong decisions are taken in this regard
  - The surveillance of the border needs to be further improved, and all units need to be fully staffed and properly equipped. They should be supported by an improved intelligence unit, providing them with operational instructions based upon a fully professional risk assessment.
  - SBS should get real competence with regard to combating irregular migration outside the border zone and the BCPs as also foreseen in the new draft law on SBS. It is not unusual for border guard services to have such powers throughout the whole territory (e.g. Poland). Instead of creating a separate unit within the Ministry of Security (de facto an additional LEA), a specialised unit to be set up within SBS, addressing (only) law enforcement issues related to controlling residence of aliens in Bosnia and Herzegovina would most likely profit from the professionalism of the SBS and the existing administrative support the HQ can provide. In the (recommended) case that the alien inspectors are to become authorised police officers within SBS, while decision making rests with civilians within the immigration administrative services of the Ministry of Security, SBS could offer the necessary enforcement support in cases where an intervention is needed.
  - The same (book of) rules should apply within the whole area of responsibility of the SBS, and the agency should be provided with a workable set of rules with regard to different levels of staff and a salary structure which allows for a wider differentiation.
  - The development of a concrete integrated border management strategy would be needed to clarify mid- and long term goals to all national and international actors, and to ensure the most efficient and cost effective co-operation between all institutions active at the border. In many areas, such as interagency co-operation and information analysis, the SBS can profit from recent developments in this regard, such as the development of the Integrated Border Management guidelines and the increased experience with risk assessment in EU States.
  - On a broader level, Bosnia and Herzegovina should strive to implement the so-called four-tiers system. This implies that a set of complementary measures has to be implemented on different levels:
1. Activities in third countries, especially in countries of origin and transit, including the collection of information by Liaison Officers as well as the key role of the consular post abroad in the process of issuing visas;



2. International border co-operation, especially, but not only, with the neighbouring countries
3. Measures at external borders: border management (border checks and border surveillance).
4. Further activities combating irregular presence and movements inside the territory.

The coherence between these measures and the way they are applied is a key to the success of this general border model, which involves more agencies than just SBS, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Security and others.

## 5.2 Support Processes / Organisation

### 5.2.1 *The Management Process*

Political supervision and operational management of the police are clearly separated

The Ministers of the Interior – if they subsist in the future – and the Ministry for Security at State level are responsible in their respective zone of competence for:

- The definition of the public security policy, which is an integral part of the respective government policies and which is discussed and agreed upon in the respective parliaments. This public security policy also delineates a global budget frame for the police/SBS with a short and medium term (3-5 years) component.
- The political coordination with the other ministries and political institutions (e.g. Ministry of Justice, Ministry for Youth and Education, Ministry for Infrastructure)
- The selection of the Police Commissioners. The selection procedure should be the same for the whole country. It should require prerequisites such as management experience and performance, police experience with corresponding of rank for the candidates

To fulfil his/her tasks, the Minister gets support from his/her Cabinet, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified advisers

The Police Commissioner/Director translates the Public Security Policy into an operational strategy with clear objectives. S/he is responsible for reaching those objectives, making the best use of the given means in people, equipment and finances:

- This operational strategy starts with a specific mission statement for each police force, the ‘common cause’ for all collaborators of the organisation. (The common cause for the Finnish Police is, for example, to make Finland the safest country within the EU). For BiH it could for example be: ‘With high level of efficient and friendly public security, we contribute to the rapid development of our country.’
- The operational strategy integrates products, processes, people and finances. In annual strategic discussion rounds, the obtained results are evaluated, changes in the environment are analysed and new strategies are adopted if necessary.

- This process leads to precise objectives on all management levels and needs a high degree of delegation and empowerment. Great attention is paid to the first management level (Chief of the Police Station / BCP), because those managers are the most essential asset for the success of the police.
- Operational management at Commissioner/Director level includes budget responsibility. The Commissioner/Director has autonomy within the given budget frame.

### 5.2.2 *Information and Communication System*

- There is a nationwide, centrally managed database network with relevant information for the police/SBS, which allows decentralised access and input
- All police units (±350) and the SBS are connected to the National Police Databank in both directions and can communicate information regarding specific events, crimes, criminal modes of operation, criminals, stolen vehicles, wanted persons, aliens, weapons and judiciary decisions
- All police/SBS units have access to other databases useful for the police work.
- A central unit makes systematic analysis of all data and detects new problems and trends as well as interregional / international phenomena; it makes its analysis available to regional crime departments
- Regions develop their own crime analysis capacity
- There is a nationwide and centrally managed communication system, by cable or other means, allowing fast and reliable exchange of information between all police units and with partner organisations such as the Ministry of Justice and other emergency organisations
- Based upon a clear information management strategy, the SBS should also further develop its internal information exchange.

### 5.2.3 *Logistics*

- Operational and support equipment (cars, weapons, information technology, communication system, laboratories, personal equipment) are up-to-date with technological progress and follow a normal maintenance and replacement cycle
- Investments, running costs and maintenance costs are planned on a long-term basis and integrated in the budgeting

- One common procurement unit follows the technological progress and is responsible for the procurement of heavy equipment, where inter-operability and economy of scale are important. Other equipment is purchased by different police units within the framework of their budget

#### 5.2.4 *The Overall Organisation*

Three different organisational models were analysed:

- The creation of one single national police with 5 to 7 regions (top-down/zero-base approach)
- The creation of two Entities' polices (FBiH and RS) comprising 5 regions on the Federation side and 2-3 regions on the RS side, plus the Brčko District, the SIPA, the SBS and several central support and coordination units at the State level (top-down approach at the level of the Entity)
- A bottom-up approach, built on the Cantons, the PSCs, and Brčko District, accepting an asymmetric development for the RS, stimulating a strong collaboration between the smaller Cantons (and Brčko District), and developing some essential common support and coordination central units at State level

A single national police as a zero base, top down approach would be based on a philosophy of rationality, favour internal efficiency, look for short and clear command structures and would be built on uniformity throughout the whole country. Such a model presents many advantages but will require strong leadership.

Then it can lead to simplification, better productivity and common doctrine. The policy integration takes place at the highest level (State), the balance between the different police products is decided at the top as well as the balance between the different regions.

A single national police is often more introvert, looking for high internal quality and efficiency and less extrovert; but tends to be less client and community oriented.

The Entities police forces model combines 'a near to zero base' approach with important elements of today's reality, namely the Federation, the RS and Brčko District (plus SIPA and SBS).

Within these units it looks also for rationality and efficiency. Political integration will take place on one hand at Entity level, on the other hand at State level. Two questions arise with such a model:

- What is the added value of such an additional 'Entity layer' compared to the first model?

- Would it be easier or more difficult to implement the necessary common and national functions, dealing with mainly two strong blocks of different mentality and culture? Other countries with a similar starting situation like Switzerland and Belgium avoid such a block-situation and work with multi-unit solutions (e.g. Switzerland with 26 Cantons)

A bottom-up approach builds on the existing local units and elaborates solutions for an organisational optimisation of the various police products.

- Local policing, as the most important basic product with an immediate impact on the quality of life, has to be produced at the level of municipality (or association of smaller municipalities). Local policing needs to be coordinated with other important policing products that are best organised at a regional level. These organisation, coordination and supervision functions can be fulfilled in a satisfying way by the Cantons or the PSCs. The local (Cantonal/PSC) anchorage of these functions mirror the constitutional (Federation) and administrative (RS) arrangements that guarantee a political control of the police functions and is an argument for a good integration of the police services in the local community.
- Rapid intervention, combating serious crime, and crowd control are, for technical and for economical reasons, best organised at a larger regional level. The threshold for the organisation of these products is 500,000 inhabitants at the minimum. Some Cantons, such as Tuzla or Sarajevo, qualify as regional units, whereas other Cantons are too small to reasonably organise these products alone. The current PSC dimensions also range below the threshold. In the bottom-up approach, inter-Cantonal collaborations are necessary to reach the threshold for organising these products efficiently. In the RS, a fusion of the police services into PSCs is advisable (goal 3 PSCs). This would mean, for instance, that 2 or more Cantons collaborate to build a technology-based control room allowing rapid intervention, crowd control or other large police operations to be productive. Teams of forensic experts or specialist in specific serious crimes can also be financed jointly under the same collaborative arrangements.
- In addition to the Cantonal and regional levels, this bottom-up model recommends (the creation of additional) central functions at the State level: combating complex criminality or inter-regional crimes, running nationwide central information database and communication systems, coordinating national events (large crowd control, disaster operation, terrorism, etc.), organising selection and training, centralising procurement for important investment (economy of scale) and for equipment requiring interoperability at national level, as well as defining policing standards and salary schemes.

All three models have their advantages and disadvantages. The evaluation and final choice depend on the weight given to the different criteria like:

- Top down or bottom up approach



- Overall organisational optimisation or client and product orientation
- ‘large industrial group’ philosophy or networking of ‘small and medium size companies’
- Central or decentralised political integration
- ‘High risk – high win’ approach or ‘stability and continuity first’
- Compatibility with partner organisations, mainly the prosecutors organisation
- Degree of necessary legal changes

All three models can be organised in an efficient way (the second model might turn out a bit less efficient), so it cannot be said that one is financially more attractive than the other.

Concerning the compatibility with a partner organisation, the bottom up model probably makes collaboration easier, due to the fact that within the future prosecutors organisation, the basic level will be the Cantonal and District level. Experience shows that easy and frequent contacts between prosecutors and police officers, facilitated by the same territorial competence, are an essential element for efficient collaboration, good communication and mutual trust and confidence. The same reasoning applies to the other partners of the police in the education, health, social affairs, and other sectors of the public administration.

Apart from the considerations for reform of the police forces as described in the previous section which are concentrated on organisational, performance and product-related issues, any of the three suggested approaches would call for changes in the legal setup so as to provide the necessary legal framework within which the reforms can be made operational. The degree and direction of changes differ, however, to a certain extent. Yet, all of the three reform options carry legal implications as well.

All three options have in common that certain tasks, such as combating complex crime or inter-regional crime, centralising procurement for important investment and equipment requiring interoperability, are to be dealt with at the national level. All three proposed reform options would thus call for constitutional, as well as legal changes on all levels of BiH.

Main task allocations, irrespective of the model:

- The organisation of the BiH Police should be strategy-, process- and product-oriented; it has to offer a good balance of the centralised (national) and decentralised units and it should be tailor-made to the needs and realities of BiH
- Local security and Community Policing are the responsibility of the regional units. They can further delegate the competences to elaborate public safety plans to the municipalities – or association of municipalities – so as to bring community policing even closer to the citizen.

- Rapid intervention, combating serious crime and crowd control are also under the regional responsibility. In order to be efficient and economic, these regions should not be too small (5-7 for BiH).
- Combating organised crime, human trafficking, terrorism, money laundering and drugs and arms trafficking are tasks of the competence of the State. Efficient and economic work is possible only at this level.
- Coordination for large events and disasters with a national dimension is a State task
- Developing and operating the national information and communication system are State tasks
- Organising the common procurement is a State task
- Developing and operating the national police selection and training system are State tasks
- Interpol and further international police collaboration are a State task



## 5.3 Personnel

### 5.3.1 Overall Staffing

- Human resources are part of the strategic plan at all levels
- Overall staffing follows best practice principles:
  - Police density per product for the future **regional units**

Average number of officers per process at regional level (2 alternatives results depending on the exact number of inhabitants)	ratio	
	applied	3,500,000 4,000,000
Global management	7,000	500
crime policing	1,500	2,400
crowd control	9,000	390
rapid intervention	1,000	3,500
local policing	1,500	2,400
total		9,190
ratio of inhabitants per officer for the regional units		381
		384

Depending on the exact figure regarding the population, 2 projections of the future distribution and volume of authorised officers in the different processes for the regional units can be made using standard ratios. In both cases the ratio of officers to the population is about 1 to 380 inhabitants at regional level. The figures are shown in the table above.

These ratios are indicators and have to be developed for each Cantonal, PSC and regional unit with an adaptation to the local realities.

- Adding the figures for the **Central Units**

SBS	2,500
SIPA	800
Interpol	50
Information and Communication Centre	50
Common procurement unit	20
National police selection and training unit	80
Standard and coordination unit	20
Total of State personnel	3,520

The total sum of authorised police officers will be approximately 12,700-14,000, with a ratio of 1 police officer per **280-300** inhabitants at national level.

In addition to the authorised officers, the civil servant support operational and administrative staff, if kept at ‘standard’ 25% level amounts to about 4000 civil servants at BiH level.

The changes from the current situation require both a transfer of personnel towards the State functions and a personnel reduction of the following categories:

1. About 1,500 authorised officers are transferred to State functions (SIPA, increase SBS personnel and other State units)
2. The overall reduction in authorised police personnel is about 3,000 officers
3. The overall reduction of civil servants is about 2,000.

These changes would lead to an average of 210 to 240 inhabitants per 1 police personnel (= civil servants and authorised personnel) instead of the current 1 for 145. The new ratio will be similar to the new regional EU members (Slovenia and Hungary).

In addition, the vision has to include the following elements:

- Internal mobility will be developed thanks to regular information to all police officers about available jobs.
- The age structure will still not be in complete balance but will show a more even distribution (today, 78% of the total police force are aged between 27 and 45).
- The percentage of female police officers will reach 10-15% (today it is around 4%).
- Police forces become multi-ethnic nation-wide

### 5.3.2 Selection and Training

- There is a national Police Selection and Training Institute that is responsible for selection criteria and procedures and that manages all aspects of police education.
- The two police academies and the High School in Banja Luka are part of this institute and continue to provide a training programme for the first entry level in the police.
- Complementing central SBS training programmes in Suhodol, a team of dedicated and adequately trained SBS officers within the field offices are responsible for all training conducted away from Suhodol. This seems essential to a cohesive and nationally standardised approach while allowing for greater flexibility.
- In addition, specialised training in modular form is offered, as well as management courses.
- Based on the existing competences of the Training Centre in Banja Luka, the High School (Junior College) could become a national centre of competence for the training for crime investigators.
- Close collaboration is institutionalised with the faculty of criminology in Sarajevo. The Faculty can provide highly trained forensic experts as well as experts in complex crimes such as financial crimes, organised crimes and other areas of specialisation in criminology.
- The training system is connected to the general education system and delivers generally recognised certificates and degrees
- Content and methods of training correspond to current standards of adult learning
- Officers are trained to assess situations, take initiative, act accordingly and report back. Part of any training is the support to professional behaviour, including independent decision making and awareness to basic human rights
- Training activities become a regular programme and are not limited to short term initiatives dependent on support by the international community.

### 5.3.3 Salaries and Other Payments

As all other organisations, the function of MoIs is to perform their tasks. Given this orientation, motivating employees ‘to perform well on tasks’ is sine qua non of MoIs existence and is certainly a primary function of management: Police Commissioners/ Directors of Police/SBS.

In order to regulate the common aspects of police work and internal organisation (e.g. salaries), a State Law on Police has been prepared. This law regulate police powers, data and intelligence exchange, police cooperation, rights and duties of police officers, the common salary – and ranking system

Police reform and modernisation projects integrated in ‘Future BiH Police’ Programme, as well as the new State Law introduced:

- a new nationwide basic salary, with local adaptation to living costs and other specificities (i.e. dangerous duty zone allowance), linked to a European style grading/rank structure
- salaries for the individual police officer and key management/accounting personnel at such level as to attract and retain qualified collaborators
- stable salaries and regular salary payments according to pay scale reflecting nature of the job and clear job description
- transparent allowance system
- regular staff evaluation

New nationwide basic salaries:

- enable MoI to become an attractive employer
- ensure that the key operational staff are remunerated at a level commensurate with their responsibilities and a programme developed to ensure Continuing Professional Development (CPD), in order to retain and advance their career progress within the Ministries of Interior/SBS.
- allow the Police Commissioners/Directors of Police/SBS to have a higher level of confidence in planning both their activity and budget plans, safe in the knowledge that there will be a minimum of disruption to police staffing
- relieve MoI personnel of dissatisfaction with the salary/allowances and stress due to the need to secure secondary jobs and succumb to temptation involving corruption.

### 5.3.4 *Management Development*

- Management development is one of the key tasks of Commissioners at all levels. A few well trained human resource specialists are members of their staff; they prepare the work and give them advice.
- All police managers are subject to an annual assessment of their performance and future potential
- First level managers get an intensive training and special attention
- The common ranking system increases mobility and transparency

## **5.4 Finance**

### **5.4.1 *Strategic budgeting – key issues***


A re-organised police sector in BiH, regardless which operational model will finally be chosen, rests on certain premises which require that budgeting becomes a strategic and highly decentralised process. The key issues are that a clear linkage be established between organisation and budget, resource input is linked to the production of output in a defined quality and quantity, and budget goals are formulated. The implementation of a product/process oriented organisation requires that the goals set for each of the identified products and processes must find their reflection in terms of costs and revenues within the global/regional/local budgets. Resource allocation decisions tied to output and clearly identified goals will be able to overcome some of the deficiencies of the present system, e.g. a mismatch between the distribution of resources between Cantons and other levels of government and the actual responsibilities for service provision.

The underlying philosophy of the new budgeting is that of a ‘contract’ between the political level and the operational level. The political level aims at satisfying the public demand for security and contracts the operational level for the production of the police products which is executed in the framework of a global budget.

In this system budget responsibility is tied to operational responsibility and lies with the Police Commissioner / Director who receives a global budget from the MoI/MoS. This presupposes a regulatory framework at the national level which sets the common rules and ensures the integrity of the national budget. The legal framework should allow the use of new instruments of flexibility which are conducive to achieving efficiency and budget targets. Such instruments should include budget autonomy of the various LEAs, the possibility to keep income / surpluses generated by the respective LEA, the possibility to build reserves, the possibility to provide performance-tied monetary incentives for staff etc.

Budgets need to reflect the reform plan. It will be necessary to break down the reform targets, e.g. reduction of staff, social plan, investments in new equipment, reduction of overall share of the police in the public service budget into short, medium and long term goals which are fed in increments into the annual budgets. It has to be recognised that some of the mentioned goals are conflicting which will require coordination and consensus building mechanisms in order to be resolved.

**Chart: Interrelationship of political effectiveness and operational efficiency in a goal-oriented budgeting/controlling system**





### **Budget policy**

In the interest of a common public budget, a common budget structure should be maintained. However, the individual decentralised budgets should be broken down to the specific needs of the regional/local levels engaged in service production. It follows a hierarchy of budgets each tied to specific targets to be reached. Budgeting usually starts at the cost-type level. These costs are allocated to the defined products and processes at each level of government through cost-accounting systems.

### **Coordination**

Within the reform concept a greater regionalisation of certain products is necessary to achieve efficiency targets as outlined in the previous sections. This poses increased demands on coordination for budgeting. Supposing that no new institutions will be created who could be tasked with coordination, responsibilities need to be assigned for the coordination of resource inputs into the respective budgets of the lower levels of the law enforcement system.

### **Benefits**

- Budget responsibility at the operational level enables the various LEA's to acknowledge their financial responsibilities and monitor their performance. All LEAs will be able – having received proper training and/or recruitment of educated and experienced staff - to prepare developed budgets based on clearly identified Police/SBS products/processes/activities.
- Annual budgets are approved/authorised by the date set by legislation and there is no financial disruption to the execution of the duties by the LEAs.
- The Police Commissioners/Directors of Police/SBS are able to make sound financial judgements on facts and rely upon a set of standardised and custom made reports available from the Treasury system. They will be able to take timely and informed decisions on their resource consumption.

**Increased professionalism:** Key positions are filled with professional accountants/finance officers ensuring quality of data input and integrity of financial records, providing a timely, effective, efficient and economic service to senior police management. Management is trained on the interpretation of financial performance reports and takes informed decisions on this basis.

## 5.4.2 Controlling

In the reformed police sector controlling is a key steering instrument, providing the ability to monitor the performance of the operational levels against set goals. The new decentralised system with delegation of responsibilities to lower levels of government is complemented by a controlling system which assumes a central steering function.

In order to have in place an efficient controlling system, the following elements will have been introduced:

- Existence of operational goals: in order to conduct a meaningful analysis of actual vs. planned status, goals must specify content, scope and time frame. The goals are derived from the reform objectives and cascade through all operational levels, national, regional and local, and are accepted by all levels.
- Sufficient information exists for informed decision-making: ideally information is processed by compatible/uniform information systems. Reports produced by the Oracle system and possible support systems reflect relevant and up-to-date information.
- Indicators are known: the reform targets suggest the elaboration of certain indicators of performance. The purpose of indicators is to help to take corrective measures when deviations from the plan occur.
- Benefits of controlling are recognised: top management supports it, the system is understood as a tool which helps reaching set targets.
- Controlling systems are in place: planning systems, adequate quantification and recording of input/output, reliable financial and cost accounting systems, strategic controlling
- Horizontal communication is well developed: counterparts understand each others tasks and problems
- Central institutions act as interface and become servicing and controlling units.

While previous control functions were primarily concerned with compliance, control of the various steps in processes and integrity of financial data controlling shifts the emphasis towards control of results. New fields in the controlling system are the description of the police products, the responsible level of government, the legal basis, the target groups, the strategic and operational goals, and indicators derived from related output and cost data. Reviews and audits assess to which extent the contracts between the political level and the operational level have been fulfilled and whether the instruments of controlling (comparison input/output, indicators and benchmarks) have been introduced and actually used by decision makers.

### **Development of indicators, benchmarking**

Due to the absence of the regulatory forces of the market and the lack of ‘market prices’ for police products, performance indicators need to be developed for the measurement of the effectiveness of the products and the efficiency of processes for their production. Previous sections have discussed both qualitative indicators, e.g. subjective sense of security by citizens, victimisation rates, satisfaction with the police and quantitative ones like the number of inhabitants per police officer, share of the police budget within the overall budget and the like. It is an essential responsibility of the Police Commissioner to work out these indicators in relation to the goals set by the political system. Achieving set performance levels demands effective vertical communication with the various operational levels of the LEAs and horizontal communications with the MoF and MoS, the SBS and other involved parties who all need to carry their share and meet specified sub-goals. It is not possible to effectively carry out such a system without strong ownership at the various levels, which means that responsibility must be matched with authority at the given level.

The absence of ‘competition’ may lead to lower efficiency than otherwise possible. It is recommended to develop a benchmarking system which compares performance both over time and against the corresponding indicators of other countries. Such a system comprises several instruments of the controlling system such as cost accounting, product catalogue and the indicators which are to be elaborated.

State Examination and Auditing institutions should be at the forefront of promulgating and disseminating new controlling/management techniques. The human resource policy should ensure proper selection of personnel and training of staff of these institutions.

### **Implementation**

The introduction of an effective controlling system is both difficult and time-consuming. Typical problems to be overcome are resistance to increased ‘transparency’, culture change which requires shifting from traditional input-oriented systems to goal/output oriented systems, to name a few. It is recommended to implement a controlling system as part of the project ‘Future BiH Police’. A project structure may be helpful in bringing the concerned actors together and develop a commonly shared notion of controlling.

Some key factors to the successful implementation of controlling projects must be observed. These include a thorough assessment of the present situation (controlling audit), the development of a controlling philosophy and identification of controlling tasks. For each of these tasks/clusters goals need to be set. The controlling organisation should be defined assigning clear functions and roles to both operational and auditing/reviewing bodies. A controlling handbook should be developed outlining the controlling methods and instruments. A step-wise plan for the implementation of the project needs to be developed and appropriate steering bodies installed. The composition of the steering group should ensure the support of the involved ministries/institutions at the highest possible level.

### 5.4.3 Sustainability

To reach a sustainable level, BiH should reduce its public spending in order to reach, at the minimum, the ratio of domestically generated revenues that is held at a 45% of GDP (according to 2002 figures, see PEIR, World Bank, 2002, p. 21). Transition countries in the region have an average level of public expenditure of 40% of GDP. To contribute to this and at the same time come near the European standards for public security spending, BiH should set the target of a 5% share of the total public spending for 2010 for the policing.

To calculate the amount of cuts in police spending necessary to achieve this result, we combine two analyses: first we estimate the gain obtained from freezing the current level of police spending as compared to the 'natural' growth of the public expenditures until 2010; we then calculate what is the remaining amount necessary to be economised in the current police budget to reach the 5% target in 2010.

A) Based on projections using a yearly 5% growth of GDP until 2010 and the current level (share to GDP) of public spending (although the target of the country, according to the PRSP paper, is to reduce it from 47% to 43% of the GDP, (see PRSP, April 2004, p. 16), the public expenditures in 2010 will be KM 5,106,317,401.90. If frozen at current level, the police budget share will reach then the target of 6.93% of the overall public expenditures.

The remaining 1.93% amounts to a total of 98 million KM (exactly: 98,551,926.- KM). This amount needs to be economised in the current police budget to reach the 5% target. If this 5% target is reached, the percentage share of the police budget to the GDP in 2010 will be about 1.5%.

Most of the economy will come from a gradual reduction of personnel. First because wages and salaries account for about 80% of all spending in the police (which is comparable to the benchmarking countries); second because, as shown in other chapters, policing is overstuffed today.

53 406 000 KM can be expected to be gained by a reduction of the overstaffing of police authorised personnel (3000 officers). Another 21 million KM can be economised with a reduction of 2000 excess support civil servants within the Mols<sup>6</sup>. The total amount of the personnel reduction will reach 75 million KM. The remaining 23 million KM cut will have to be obtained via future scale economies in common procurement and other rationalisation measures. It should be quite obvious that BiH will have no financial room of manoeuvre for investment in modernisation of its technology and will still need the assistance of the international community for the necessary investment for the reconstruction and modernisation of its heavy equipment (IT, communication systems, modern control rooms, and vehicles). It should be

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<sup>6</sup> In 2003, the average annual costs of an authorised office in BiH is 17802 KM ; the average annual costs of a civil servant is 10'500 KM.



noted that this assistance is not guaranteed today. We strongly recommend also that decisive criteria for procurement of equipment should be their low operating costs in order to limit the recurrent costs.

Finally, it is important that the governments of BiH recognise the fact that to invest in personnel overstaff in a transition time does not bring any perspective for the future. Instead, a social plan needs to be put into place in order to make the cut socially acceptable. In the end, there will be no return on this investment for the police. As an alternative, the police needs to invest in increasing its productivity. Apart from capacity-building via training the personnel in all operational and support areas, technology is a major constitutive element of productivity and will necessitate the correlative investment. Typically, Slovenia in 2003 is still investing more than other European countries to catch up with modernisation. The transition country Slovenia still invests about 6.7% of its budget in equipment today while a 'modern' German Land such as Rheinland-Pfalz in Germany invests only 2.2%. Due to deficient figures in BiH, the current level of investment could not be calculated.

B) Second, since the burden of policing in the Federation falls almost completely on the Cantons' shoulders, that the public policies portfolio of Cantons is already large and that the financial capacity of the Cantons is relatively modest, there might be a need for a better and fairer redistribution of the resources across levels of government. A similar comment is made by the PRSP: 'resource allocation between different levels of government is often unadjusted to responsibilities for service provision in the public sector' (p. 32, PRSP, April 2004). This needs to be addressed by the global public administration reform. Even if we take into account that in the Federation, the main beneficiary of the policing restructuring measures will be the (rural) Cantons if the police staff number is adapted to the reality of the local problems, there still will be a redistribution problem across levels of government or between Cantons. Introducing redistribution (solidarity) mechanisms between Cantons should also be considered, given the wide disparity of revenues between Cantons. This vertical and horizontal redistribution will depend on the organisational and constitutional model adopted. This issue is addressed in a general way in the discussion of the possible future reorganisation models.

## AGENDA

Police Assessment – a System Approach

Assessment of the Present Situation

Products

Support Processes / Organisation

Personnel

Finance

SBS

SWOT Summary

Analysis of the Environment

The Vision: Future Strategies and Structural Consequences

Products

Support processes / Organisation

Personnel

Finance

**The Road to the Future**

Management of the Change Strategies

The Implementation Program

## 6 THE ROAD TO THE FUTURE

### 6.1 Strategies for Managing Change

Change Management is already a complex task in settled and well established organisations and countries.

It is even more complex in BiH, where many things are changing at the same time and where the poor economic situation with its negative consequences for most of the citizens creates anxieties, anger and tensions. That is why – before starting or continuing the change process on police – some basic strategies as to how to lead change and how to implement the new policing system in BiH should be worked out.

We would like to give some recommendation based on 25 years of experience on implementing police reform in more than 10 European countries, including transition countries and countries with multicultural and multilingual societies.

‘Local ownership is more important than a perfect solution on paper’. Local ownership can only be reached by intensive information and discussion on the new concepts. If possible, a few visits to countries where such concepts are applied in practice should be organised. To see and feel the reality of new policing and of modern structures has much more persuasion power than the best reports. The final decision on the precise new concept and the definition of the details should be left to local decision makers – if possible with the assistance and support from external experts.

‘Do not reinforce existing fronts by creating two or three homogenous blocks. Experience shows that it is easier to create a good system with good collaboration based on 10-20 smaller units rather than based on large ethnic or language blocks. The Swiss Police system is based on 26 Cantonal police forces and a limited number of common and national functions. Netherlands works with 25 regional police units and a few central units. The police reform in Belgium did not offer to create a Flemish, a Walloon and a Brussels police organisation.

‘Look for coherence with ongoing reforms in partner organisations’. One of the most important partners of Police is Justice. Prosecutors have to work in close co-operation with police officers. That is why the reform of both institutions has to follow the same pattern. In the prosecutors’ reform, the Cantonal level and the PCS level are defined as the basic working units in the future. It makes sense to coordinate and synchronise the police reform with this approach.

‘Invest in people first’. A key for success is the early identification and the development of local leaders of change. They should be trained and integrated in the implementation project structure. Another important investment in people is to raise salaries for police officers – in the framework of a common salary system – above the critical level of living costs.



## 6.2 The Implementation Programme

The first important step is to reach a large political and operational endorsement on the vision ‘Future BiH Police’. A Police-Commission, which should discuss this report, is planned for this purpose. In order to stimulate discussion and progress rapidly, a number of technical subcommittees could be created (e.g. on products, processes/organisation, personnel and finances). Some support from police reform experts could possibly help to keep the discussion at an objective level and also to always keep in mind European standards and examples of best practices.

Once the common understanding is reached, a global and professionally led project-organisation ‘Future BiH Police’ should be set up, with a local project leader. His profile is vital. He must incorporate leadership, police competences and project management experience.

This project should be supervised by a political Steering Committee, guaranteeing regular political oversight, fast decision making for the important steps and close co-operation among the main actors.

In parallel to the preparation of the project, a large information and deployment programme should be initiated. Its objectives are to inform (and train) as many key players as possible on all levels about new policing and the Project ‘Future BiH Police’. A special programme should be set up for MoI and members of the various parliaments.

The project will be divided into subprojects, also led by local project leaders. The subprojects prepare detailed concepts and implementation programmes, taking into account the local specificities. Possible subprojects are:

### Future products:

- Local security
- Rapid intervention
- Combating crime
- Crowd control

### Future processes:

- Management
- Information and Communication system
- Logistics / Common procurement
- Organisation

**Personnel:**

- Staffing
- Selection and Training
- Salaries
- Management Development

**Finances:**

- Budgeting
- Controlling
- Sustainability

- Existing projects in the local and international community should be integrated or interlinked with those subprojects
- A certain number of specific actions should be started with high priority, e.g.

- Training in financial matters
- Training in local security
- Development of the common salary system
- Development of the social plan for the reduction of police staff

**A social plan**

The problem of overstaffing needs a subtle, humane and long-term approach. The basic philosophy should integrate the following elements:

- To care about each individual person who is part of the surplus, and to offer him/her support and the best possible ways to find a new job or to go to early retirement.
- To start as soon as possible with the new organisation and the new staffing rules. The newly shaped units should concentrate on their new objectives and tasks and be responsible for a high level of productivity. They should not be obliged to handle the surplus problem in the long run.
- To create 1-2 specific transfer / reserve units who would take care of the surplus personnel, relocate them physically, care for the individual retraining / new job plans, but also take initiatives to make the best use of their personal resources.

Practically, the following steps should be taken:

- creation of a subproject ‘Transfers’ within the ‘Future BiH Police’ Project
- this subproject has to work out the principles and rules for the Transfer-operation

- it also offers information and assistance to the police managers for the first steps
- at a later stage, it could even be transformed into the operational Transfer unit.

In the next phase, the police managers have to reshape their units following the ‘Future BiH Police’ principles defined by the Police Commission. They must identify people who should stay and people who should go to the Transfer unit. This has to be done on an individual basis, taking into account the personal profile, the training received, the engagement, the motivation shown in the past and the future potential to make positive contributions to the new police work. At this stage already, for those who want to leave the police force and start a new career, a bonus can be offered and paid out.

The Transfer unit takes over all the surplus people and gets paid for the respective personnel costs by the original employers. It relocates its people in different premises and then follows its two objectives:

- To help people find new jobs inside or outside the police by retraining, maintaining the right of first refusal concerning vacancies inside the police, etc.
- To make the best economical use of its resources by executing tasks and works inside and outside police against payment at market prices

Ideally, this Transfer unit should have finished its work before 2010.

Not choosing such an approach bears the risk that the intended streamlining and focusing of the police units will never be reached.

### **The legal consequences**

The legal consequences of the proposed reform have to be seen in the light of the total Public Administration Reform. The police have to fit into the new model.

The roadmap will have to analyse the legal consequences of each model within the framework of the initial thoughts developed in the vision section in more depth.

### **Local ownership**

Local ownership was already a focal point during the assessment. In addition to the many interesting discussions that took place during the visits to all LEAs, there were workshops organised with the Police Commissioners/Directors, the Financial and the Organisational Liaison officers. All three groups agreed fully with the results of the SWOT analysis. Moreover, the group of Commissioners and Directors discussed and agreed to the most important critical issues for the future of the police reform. These are in order of priority:

1. A strategic planning and controlling using performance indicators (steering board) and integrated budgeting
2. A national information and analysis system managed centrally and with quick and easy access and input from the field
3. A national training system networking the existing training institutions as competence centres and offering all types of training (basic, specialisation, support and management)
4. A national and appropriate salary scheme using an index system for local adaptation to living cost
5. The systematisation of community policing practices at the police station level by all-round officers
6. A rapid intervention division/process based on regional (integrated) technology-based control and operation rooms
7. A centralised process for definition of technical specification of interoperable technical equipment and for procurement for heavy investments

At the political level, the project was supervised by a Steering Committee composed by the Minister of Security at State level, all MoIs, the Mayor of Brcko and representatives of the international community. This type of political supervision is another important element of local ownership and should be maintained and developed for the next phases of the Police reform.

These multiple contacts confirmed our judgement that there are good local professionals, open to reform and change.